

that it is from God, by his study of the evidence of the facts of the Gospel history. But he may have an equally reasonable and far stronger conviction, derived from the teaching itself. He may, as our Lord very distinctly and decidedly intimates, have such a knowledge of God as to be able to recognize God's voice when He speaks. Is it not in the highest degree reasonable to suppose that, if there is a God who is the perfection of all that is great and good, a creature that he has made capable of knowing Him, should so know Him as to be able to recognize His voice, or, in other words, able to determine, from the character of a professed message from Him, whether that message is really from Him; while another creature, though also capable of knowing Him, may be so ignorant of Him as not to be able to recognize His voice? Is there such a difference between one man's knowledge of a human author and another man's knowledge of him, that the one knows at a glance that a certain piece of writing is his production, while the other is utterly incompetent to form any judgment in the matter; and may there not be such a difference between one man's knowledge of God and another man's knowledge of Him, that the one can recognize the voice of God when He speaks, while the other cannot? It is so, according to the teaching of Christ. And, in accordance with this teaching, it is a matter of fact in human experience, that there are men who can recognize God's voice and men who cannot. These two classes of men are respectively those who are willing to do the will of God and those who are not. The man who is willing to do the will of God comes to know that the teaching of Jesus is from God, by attaining such a knowledge of Him as to be able to recognize His voice—an ability which the man who is not willing to do the will of God cannot acquire.

There can be no objection to the views now presented, arising from the fact of man's native depravity and ignorance of divine things, neither of which frees him from the obligation resting on him as God's rational creature. As we have already said, a man who is very ignorant of the will of God, and conscious of much imperfection and sin may, notwithstanding, be truly willing to do the will of God; and he certainly is so, if he actually, though very imperfectly, endeavours to do the will of God in so far as he knows it, and uses available means to know it further. Did our limits permit, or were it required by the object of the present paper, it might be shown in detail that the man who is willing to do the will of God is *no other* than the *sinful* man who, under conviction of sin, has been led to inquire what he must do to be saved. But, inasmuch as it is in connection with conviction of sin, or the awakening of conscience, that what is commonly called the *moral* evidence of Christianity passes into what is