

or delegation of political and military authority. They would feel that they are being called on to share the costs and the risks of a coalition without commensurate participation in its control; a point of view which has been put in its extreme form in the slogan "no annihilation without representation".

There is probably no final answer to this dilemma between functional efficiency and sovereign equality. The lines along which we are trying to find one in NATO involve the recognition of leadership, power and special responsibilities, on the one hand, and recognition, on the other hand, of the necessity (as the price for free co-operation) for the stronger members of the international association to give consideration to the special problems and the sensibilities of the others. Only in this way, and it requires a high degree of tolerance, understanding and maturity, can a coalition of friendly but free states be made to work.

Our third example is the move towards European unity. This is more significant, in some respects, even than the United Nations or NATO, as an evidence of the trend towards closer international association and its effect on national sovereignty. This is a stirring development of historic significance. There are, of course, many reasons for it: the urgent need for collective defence against the Soviet threat; the growth of European feeling, in the face of the preponderance of power of Soviet Russia and the United States of America; the lesson of two wars, that Europe to survive must remove the cause of strife between European countries themselves, especially between France and Germany; finally, the desire to increase European economic and productive activity in order to reduce the present dependence on United States assistance. For these and other reasons there seems to be a general dissatisfaction in Western Europe with the limitations and disadvantages of national sovereignty and an urge to a broader European basis for political organization.

From this urge has come the Brussels arrangements, the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and the proposed European Defence Community.

These developments illustrate not only the benefits that may come from greater unity on a regional rather than a national basis but also the complexities that arise in devising constitutional arrangements to this end which are both equitable and workable. Here again the problem of voting rights has been conspicuous. The smaller countries in Western Europe included in these projects have been concerned about the protection of their equal rights and the achievement of a fair share in the direction of the new organizations. At the same time it has been necessary to give recognition to the unequal functional contributions of the participating countries. Therefore, the principle of one state, one vote, has had to be modified in the interest of co-operative efficiency.

For the Schuman Plan, for instance, there will be an Assembly composed of seventy-eight delegates from the six member states, appointed by the various national parliaments or elected by direct suffrage. France, Germany and Italy will each have eighteen delegates and votes, Belgium and the Netherlands, ten each, and Luxembourg four. There will also be a Council of Ministers composed of one member from each state, but in this Council, there is a balancing of voting rights in favour of France and Germany, which are the largest coal and steel producers.