

- 2) the Russian military has been accorded the right to sell arms and equipment to see to the "social needs" of officers;
- 3) private arms dealers were created in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union;
- 4) the illegal arms trade has increased as a result of various factors: "...weak governmental authority and legislation, general social disorder, loss of control over the armed forces, weak law enforcement and minimal public respect of the law, porous interstate borders, and the ready availability of weapons from the immense stockpiles of the former Soviet military establishment" (p. 122).

The easy accessibility to stockpiles of light weapons, coupled with ethnic, religious, national and other tensions in FSU states, make the region "extremely volatile."

- 514.** Husbands, Jo L. "Controlling Transfers of Light Arms: Linkages to Conflict Processes and Conflict Resolution Strategies." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 127-139.

Husbands notes that a comprehensive body of literature on light weapons trafficking is just emerging. Three obstacles which limit the prospects for controlling the proliferation of light weapons are analysed:

- 1) the plethora of suppliers, recipients, and types of weapons available;
- 2) the scope of the problem which includes open commerce, black and gray markets and covert assistance given sub-national groups;
- 3) the paucity of information on light weapons transfers.

In the first part of the essay, the focus is on controls to limit the spread of light weapons. Several "fundamental questions" are analysed which must be addressed before supply-side controls can be effective. How much to try to control (e.g., limit the effort to the black market, or include covert assistance to subnational groups)? What are the goals of controls? What will one consider a "success"?

Citing the difficulty of answering the above questions, Husbands suggests that "...we should not think about controlling light arms transfers on the level of specific tools and tactics" (p. 130). Rather, a broader approach is needed which focuses on the fact that light weapons are the ones actually used in combat: "Put simply, the starting point for designing control strategies for light weapons should be the conflicts in which these weapons are likely to be used" (p. 131).

The policy tools available at three stages of conflict are also examined. First, before a conflict begins (or in its early stages) negotiation may be possible before a major battle erupts. To this end, national export controls or transfer records would be useful. Second, the scope of conflict might be limited through the use of weapons embargoes. Finally, when the fighting stops, negotiating a fair and sustainable peace settlement is essential.

Husbands concludes that an analysis of the stages and processes of conflict provides several policy tools since it "...illuminates the problem of light arms proliferation and could simplify the task of identifying, assessing, and ultimately implementing different arms control strategies" (p. 133).

Included also is an Appendix: "How Wars End – A Look at the Experience Since 1945."

- 515.** Karp, Aaron. "Small Arms – The New Major Weapons." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 17-30.

Major weapons systems have been given a high profile in the twentieth century, but the nature of conflict around the world has been changing since the end of the Cold War. Growing numbers of civil wars, and ethnic and sectarian violence have all contributed to a revolution in the arms trade which accords a dominant role to light weapons.

Karp is critical of analysts for failing to adjust arms control paradigms in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Three paradigms used to analyse the arms trade are examined. One attributes the proliferation of weapons to technological innovation and its diffusion. Another credits the international distribution of power. A third emphasizes the role of international regimes, focusing on the ways that states buy and sell arms. Karp