

defensiveness going between the two sides. So long as some forces or weapons or deployments have greater offensive capability than others, the removal of the more offensive constituents will contribute to the achievement of mutual defensive superiority. If both sides, and in particular the one with the more offensive posture, move in this direction a cumulative process may be started in which threatening postures are reduced, security improved and arms levels decreased.

There are three possible methods of implementing a switch from one strategy to the other: by independent actions, consultation and traditional negotiation.

An independent act means that one side directly changes the level and characteristics of its actual or planned forces.

Consultation means discussing with your opponent, and discussing in domestic forums he can observe, the logic and merits of a defensive strategy and taking those steps that appear to enhance your mutual security, urging him to do likewise. This could be described as positive dialogue; one side says, "I am unilaterally going to undertake these steps that will make us both more secure; I suggest you take those steps." The exchange is primarily informative and persuasive in design.

Negotiation means attempting to strike bargains in which a change in arms policy is made conditional on a change by the other side, on the grounds that it is not safe to modify your posture unless your opponent reciprocates by doing likewise. This could be described as negative dialogue; one side says, "I will not do this unless you do that," thus putting both sides into adversarial postures.

It is rational to take independent actions insofar as they increase your security on a short and long view, or at least maintain it at an adequate level even if the other side does not make a change: there is no sense in not doing things that are in your own best interest. Independent moves will be possible where (a) you possess more offensive forces than you need and can simply cut them and (b) you can, at reasonable cost, substitute defensive for offensive forces.

It is also rational to engage your potential opponent in a discussion about alternative strategies so as to try to make him understand what you are doing and persuade him to do likewise. The talks between the two alliances on doctrine might fulfil this role.

It will be felt that it is not possible to move without an assurance of reciprocity where you have offensive weapons for which no effective defensive substitute is possible—for example, aircraft and warships. Therefore, in these cases you will probably need to negotiate. That does not mean you should attempt to review and categorize *all* weapons, defining them as defensive or offensive, or more or less defensive or offensive on some scale. That is a hopeless

exercise. Rather you need to pick out some obviously offensive categories of weapons, or potentially offensive deployments of forces, and negotiate their reduction or elimination by both sides. This might be done in the proposed negotiations to eliminate the capacity for surprise attack.

That it is possible, when the political will is there, to pick out the most offensive weapons or deployment, and agree to do without them, has been demonstrated in post-war history. One example is the Middle East peacekeeping arrangement on the Golan Heights which includes a wholly demilitarized zone and then surrounding buffer zones in which offensive weapons are limited. The zones are policed by the United Nations. The regime has been in operation, successfully, since 1974. Another is the treaty between the United States and Taiwan under which the United States agrees to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons only.

It would be a mistake to think that one can proceed only by traditional negotiation and use that method where unilateral changes would be possible. Negotiation of arms reductions rests on the assumption that the weapons or forces you are dealing with are inherently offensive so that balance is needed and shifts towards defensiveness are impossible. And it is a highly adversarial procedure, likely to cause trouble and frustrate progress from the start. If it is not guarded against, the armies of experts, politicians, bureaucrats and military advisers who have spent years in and around the negotiating arenas, will be all too likely, if the notion of defensiveness is adopted, to grab it and run with it into their negotiating chambers where they will wrangle and bicker over definitions, numbers and verification, as they have done in traditional arms control negotiations. The extent to which the statements by both sides about the Vienna talks on conventional forces, quoted earlier, concentrate on traditional negotiation is rather disturbing. The successful adoption of non-offensive defence requires that the use of adversarial negotiating procedures be minimized and that mutually reassuring and cooperative behaviour be progressively developed.

The kind of practical approach one wants to see in Vienna has two ingredients:

1. The first step is to pick out and agree on the key components of today's forces, the radical reduction or removal of which by both alliances will most greatly reduce their offensive capabilities and thereby increase stability. For example, will not the removal by both sides of tanks, heavy artillery, attack aircraft and missiles of more than battlefield range produce a collapse in offensive capabilities relative to defensive capabilities? Will not the removal of tanks alone achieve this in large measure, perhaps decisively? And are there other steps that might be helpful, for example, the establishment of frontier zones in which there are