

*" . . . the Federal Government is responsive to those voices that argue that Canada, if it is not to remain a hewer of wood and drawer of water for a wealthy, populous American industrial state, must conserve these resources . . . "*

decision-making process. However generous in intention, this is for Canadians the wrong kind of solution. If the ten provinces of Canada are going to have a legitimate place in the American policy-making process, they should go the whole hog and become states. We learned in the evolution of the Commonwealth that no major power can determine its foreign policy other than unilaterally, and pretences to the contrary only breed friction.

[LE DEFI AMERICAIN]

Le défi américain is the product of the enormous vitality of the American economy and the American culture. It is based not in Washington but in New York and Houston and Hollywood and Cambridge, Mass., and is anything but monolithic. The United States Government couldn't bottle it up even if it wanted to. What is more, most of us would not want it to do so. This "threat" is regarded by most Canadians as a mixed blessing. If it is a subversive movement, then it has a large fifth column. Before we know what, if anything, we want the United States Government to try to do about the challenge, we have to decide what restrictions 22 million Canadians can agree on. And in most cases it is up to the Canadian rather than the United States Government to do something. Canadians too often think their problems are unique, but le défi américain, a term coined by a European, is universal and must be seen in that context. We resist the way Americans have regarded progress and modernization as synonyms for Americanization, but we make the same mistake in reverse by identifying the evils of industrialization and pollution with one country rather than recognizing that American corruption is just an advanced case of a universal disease.

[ANTI-AMERICANISM]

Like the United States, we have over two centuries of a separate tradition. If we want to preserve those social, political and constitutional habits and institutions which we have nourished, there is no reason to confuse this instinct with the kind of nationalism which created wars in the past century. Americans have an infuriating tendency to call Canadian resistance nationalism, the assumption being that the case of the American bank or publication which wants entry into Canada is internationalism. Resistance to cultural

and economic forces from the United States should not be confused with anti-Americanism. Genuine anti-Americanism is a world-wide phenomenon found in Canada, though to a lesser extent than in the United States . . . Genuine anti-Americans are a small but shrill minority in Canada. If Americans do not want to swell their ranks, they must learn to distinguish between the predominant forms of nationalism in Canada and malevolent anti-Americanism.

[STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS]

Canadian survival has depended to a considerable extent on the fact that Canadian-American relations consist of an enormous number of different strands and that we negotiate sometimes from strength and sometimes from weakness, but our total weakness would be considerable if the United States were a phenomenon in the singular.

[THE SUPERPOWER]

A continuing dilemma for Canadians, among others, is to determine whether the United States and its inhabitants will become less intimidating if one deals toughly with them or if one makes certain sacrifices to maintain their good will. There are strong arguments for standing firm — not allowing super-powers to trample on one's rights, because they so often tend to do so without even noticing. On the other hand there is a strong argument that super-power people are more understanding and accommodating when they feel secure rather than when they feel threatened. In the Canadian case, there is a particularly strong argument for combining a policy of firm defense of Canadian rights with constant reassurance that no threat to the security and prosperity of the United States can come through Canada. The argument for remaining in some form of military alliance with the United States at the present time is not so much that the military infrastructure is required but that a rupture of the relationship would encourage or provide a good excuse for Americans to refuse consideration of Canadian interests. The cynical Canadian is fond of saying that that is the situation anyway, but he does his country no good by saying so. His imagination does not contemplate a situation in which relations between these two North American countries would be determined solely on the basis of a struggle for power.

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