

alleged results of Spiritism, to which reference will be made. A personal idealism is quite unverifiable; because, leaving aside the subjectivistic form in which it sometimes disports itself, an attitude which hardly demands serious consideration and raises more difficulties than it can ever expect to solve, this sort of idealism involves a generalization based on an insecure analogy. It inevitably falls back on an interpretation of reality as a whole in the light of one of its parts or aspects, the relation of which part or aspect to the whole is unascertainable. And where this unfounded procedure is avoided, then idealists have to admit, as, for example, Mr. Bradley does, that belief in human immortality forms no part of a system of philosophy.

Admitting, however, for the sake of the argument, the correctness of idealistic interpretations, like Berkeley's, which culminate in the belief in an all-sustaining personal being, does such theological Idealism necessarily guarantee human immortality? Although in the popular mind theism and immortality are supposed to go together, yet this question has to be answered negatively. Belief in a personal God can be accepted only on the supposition that the attributes of this being are subject to, probably, ultimately indeterminable, but evidently heavy, limitations; for an analysis of experience does not support the combination of omniscience, omnipotence, and all-goodness, although any one of these might be maintained in isolation, or even possibly the first two apart from the attribution of moral qualities, in the human sense, to this ultimate Being. An analysis of experience goes to show that the metaphysical category of substance is more comprehensive than the moral category of goodness. Hence, admitting the theistic hypothesis, with the dualism which it seems inevitably to involve, it is not evident that God would have bestowed eternal life on human beings even if he could have done so; or, on the other hand, that he could have done so, even if he would. Against this, it is no valid argument to urge that the absence of immortality would be inconsistent with the goodness of God or with the existence of a moral