

Fortunately here, too, there are reasons for hope. The first Special Session of this Assembly on Disarmament was a success. For those who believe as I do that modern weapons are as much a threat as a protection to the security of nations, this was an encouraging step. Yet the record since that time is disappointing. The new machinery of negotiation in Geneva is blocked by rivalry and suspicion. The testing of nuclear weapons continues, despite the high priority the Special Session gave to the ban. Preparations for chemical warfare continue; no agreement has been reached on measures to limit the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering; and spending for military purposes grows even larger.

Nevertheless, a hopeful sign of urgency remains. I cite the communiqué signed in Vienna last June by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev, in which they commit their governments "to take major steps to limit nuclear weapons with the objective of ultimately eliminating them, and to complete successfully other arms limitation and disarmament negotiations".

Canada has a particular interest in the honouring of this commitment — we are the only country that is a neighbour to both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. As such we could not escape the devastation of a strategic nuclear war. Hence our specific concern.

But there is another reason for our deep interest. Canada has been a pioneer in the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Our CANDU power reactor is an outstanding success both in Canada and abroad. But we are determined that this technology not be misused. We demand that stringent safeguards be applied by countries buying Canadian nuclear power facilities or materials. We are looking forward to the conclusions of International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, the international study examining the further means by which nonproliferation standards can be applied to the nuclear fuel cycle. We want to ensure that the continued recourse to nuclear power is undertaken in the most stringent conditions possible, guaranteeing against any non-peaceful use.

We believe that governments who accept these conditions, indeed all governments, have a right to expect that the obligations of nuclear states under the non-proliferation treaty will be carried out — including the pursuit of "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date". Yet agreement has eluded the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban for 15 years. Time is running out — and the patience of the people is running thin.

Genuine international security is not merely a matter of agreements on arms control and disarmament. Before such agreements can be reached, and certainly before they can have effect, there must be a climate of trust, of decency and justice among the nations of the world. Confidence must be built up by small steps between neighbours, between alliances, and between the nuclear powers. The United Nations must be allowed to expand its fact-finding and peace-seeking roles if such confidence is to grow. In areas where tensions are too high, concrete steps must be taken to prevent accidents or miscalculations. More information must be shared before the strength of

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