

swamps and Cayo Largo, south of Cuba. We have no reason to doubt these statements. If the U.S. sells Cuba small planes for peaceful purposes, Canada should feel free to do likewise. We are told the U.S. export permits are endorsed "other than for military uses."

5. The goodwill to be gained from this sale is such that it might even be a good investment for Canada to donate the aircraft as a gesture of friendship. As it is, the Cubans offer to pay by letter of credit. We understand that Cuba had seven Beavers at the start of this year, but four have already crashed due to the inexperience of pilots, and none of the remaining three is airworthy. There is apprehension here lest the Prime Minister lose his life while flying in one of these old Canadian Beavers. We could look on the new Beaver as a replacement for one of the old ones, rather than as an addition to Cuba's air power! Dr. Castro himself has taken a strong personal interest in obtaining this plane.

6. I am giving a copy of this letter to the Ambassador, at his request.

R.R. PARLOUR

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*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

[Ottawa], January 12, 1960

EXPORT OF BEAVER AIRCRAFT TO CUBA

In my memorandum of December 24[†] I brought to your attention a telegram from our Ambassador in Cuba informing us that the Cuban authorities had written to the Embassy asking Canada to permit the sale of a Beaver aircraft to Cuba for the use of the Agrarian Institute and for the personal use of Prime Minister Castro. You concurred in our suggestion that in view of the recent Cabinet decision and since the circumstances have not changed, we should confirm to our Embassy that the sale is not authorized.

I attach copies of letters Nos. 5 and 11 of January 5 and 6 from our Ambassador in Havana in which he reports renewed efforts on the part of the Cuban Government to obtain an export permit. I draw your attention particularly to his statement (in paragraph 3 of letter No. L-11) that continued refusal to consider this application could result in public criticism in Cuba, which would be unfortunate in view of Canada's present good relations. It appears that the new Cuban Ambassador to Canada, Luis Baralt, may call on you soon to discuss this question. There is also a possibility that Dr. Castro might call either you or the Prime Minister by telephone, although our Ambassador suggests that this comment on the part of Dr. Castro may have been no more than an emotional outburst.

The Ambassador, after learning from his United States colleagues that Cuba had obtained Cessnas and other civilian aircraft from the United States, asked whether Cabinet was aware of the softening of United States policy (on October 16) when considering the Cuban applications. United States policy was clearly defined in your Memorandum to Cabinet, and no new element is contained in the attached letters which would warrant a reversal of policy. Our Embassy in Washington has informed us that in the view of United States officials the United States was hasty in relaxing its policy with regard to the export of arms to the Caribbean area, and that if reviewed again, policy would probably become more restrictive.

The Inspector-General of the Cuban Air Force was inaccurate in telling our Ambassador that the Beaver cannot be armed; Batista did in fact arm three Beavers and used them against