

Whatever has happened in Korea, there has been no appeasement and no Munich pact. For myself, I find it difficult to tolerate criticisms of President Truman and of the United States Government by people, wherever they may be, who approved of the Munich pact and of the betrayal to Hitler of the gallant little republic of Czechoslovakia.

But whatever we may think about Korea, I suppose we shall all agree—and it has been said several times already in this debate—that Korea is only a side-show. The future of the western world will not be decided in Korea but in Europe; and it is certain phases of the European situation which I now ask leave to discuss.

There is one great unanswered question in Europe today, a question that each of us asks himself from time to time, and it is this: Will Soviet Russia start World War III by attacking Western Europe within the next few months or years? The apprehension and the uncertainty about the answer to that question is the "fear of force" which is referred to in the Speech from the Throne. Anyone who tries to answer that question at all reasonably must do so with many qualifications. First of all, he must admit that conditions are likely to change very quickly and to vitiate any judgment which one might now form. Secondly, he must admit that there are some factors which perhaps are totally unknown, and other factors of which the relative weight is very difficult to assess. Thirdly, he must say quite frankly that he may be entirely mistaken in his judgment. But having done this, and having made all these qualifications, I venture to say, with great temerity, that as conditions exist today I believe that an all-out attack by Soviet Russia on Western Europe is unlikely; or perhaps I should even qualify that and say, not very likely.

Let me give the house the reasons which have led me to that view. In dealing with Soviet Russia we have always got to remember that we are dealing with two different factors. We are dealing first of all with Marxist dogma, and secondly with Russian imperialism. It is a mixture; and the proportions vary, they are not constant. Now I think it is true to say that at the beginning of the revolution, in the days of Lenin, the Marxist dogma as he expounded it was supreme. Lenin, as honourable senators will recall, denounced and renounced Russian expansionist aims. Under Stalin conditions have changed. Russian expansionism has come more and more to the fore and is now, I would say, by very long odds the predominant element in the mixture. Nevertheless, Marxist doctrine is still professed as the official belief of the rulers of Russia.

Looking at the question of military invasion of Western Europe from the viewpoint of Marxist doctrine, the answer seems to be clear. As I have had occasion to point out once before in this house, that doctrine is that the capitalist countries are bound inevitably, sooner or later, to collapse from their own internal weaknesses and stresses and strains. If that is so, and if that is what the rulers of Russia really believe, obviously war is for them an unnecessary gamble; they have nothing to do but wait, and sooner or later the prize will fall into their lap. A few years ago I would have been inclined to give more weight to that argument than I would today, because as the years roll on the realization must be increasingly forced on the rulers of Russia that the economy of the western world, which they confidently expected to collapse immediately after the war, and which all their literature shows that they confidently expected to collapse, is giving no sign of collapse but is in fact getting stronger; and I would suppose that the faith of the leaders of Russia in that particular Marxist dogma must by now be somewhat dim. But to the extent that they still believe in the Marxist theories which they continue to profess, that belief is, for what it may be worth, an argument against their going to war.

To turn from economic theory to cold facts and political realities: I think there are a number of cogent reasons in support of the view that I have expressed. The first is the atom bomb. As you all know, in the view of Mr. Winston Churchill the atom bomb is the chief protection of the West at the present moment. Of course the extent and duration of western superiority in the atom bomb are unknown, but I think there can be no doubt that today the Soviets greatly fear this weapon. If you want to get an inkling of what is in the minds of the leaders in the Kremlin, you can very often derive it from a consideration of the propaganda that is being put out by their puppets in the Western World. We know what that propaganda has been during the last year or two. There has been the Stockholm peace pledge, and there have been those so-called peace conferences in various centres throughout the world, upon which a vast deal of money and time and effort have been expended. It is interesting to note that the chief feature of the Stockholm peace pledge and of these peace conferences has been the slogan "Ban the atom bomb". I think that is a significant indication of what the leaders of Soviet Russia wish to accomplish by this propaganda, disguised under the name of peace. They want to develop a public opinion in