

III STRUCTURAL RECOMMENDATIONS

(i) **Deliberation by the Security Council**

There is an imperative need for the Security Council to carefully deliberate over decisions for the setting up of peace operations. The Yugoslav and Somalia operations were set up under pressure; in the former case from the European Community, and in the latter from the electronic media. Because these were set up without adequate preparations and a framework of an agreed settlement, both suffered from what came to be known as “mission creep”.

(ii) **Structural reform of the Security Council**

Structural reform of the Security Council is essential. Decisions pertaining to the setting up of missions, the mandates conferred, the composition of the force, the rules of engagement, reviews of conduct and performance of such missions from time to time, and so on, **cannot**, and **must not**, be the sole prerogative of two or three powerful members of the Security Council. The decision making process must be more broad-based, and the consultative process even more so. Any reform of the Security Council should seek to achieve four main objectives: clarification of the role and mandate of the Council; reconstitution of its membership; broadening of the base of participation and transparency in the work of the Council; and strengthening the effectiveness and credibility of the Council.

(iii) **Command and control**

A mission is either undertaken by the United Nations, or by a regional/sub-regional organization, or a multi-national force, with a clear political direction and under a clear command structure. There must never be any question of shared responsibility for command and control for any aspects of execution within a mission, as was attempted in the former Yugoslavia at later stages of the operation, between the United Nations and NATO, with the disastrous results we are aware of. All forces deployed in a mission area, must take their orders from the Head of Mission or the Force Commander, and implement them in the correct spirit. It is for the Head of Mission or the Force Commander to be careful and discreet in decisions that are sensitive. Some guidance from the political authority may be necessary on occasions, but backing for the Mission Headquarters must be unqualified.

(iv) **Organisation of Mission**

Mission headquarters must be so organized and structured, as to breed confidence in the contributor nations, and personnel who form part of a mission. The system followed in earlier years for UN peacekeeping operations, where commanders and staff were gathered together at short notice (as in the case of UNPROFOR), and whose allocation was based on equitable representation related to troop contributions, may have worked when the pressures on operations were not as significant as they are today. That system is not workable under present day conditions, increasingly dangerous as they are.² Heads of missions