

permanent centre for conflict prevention and discussion of arms control agreements.⁷ Although the US preferred to postpone discussion of specific institutionalization until after the CFE Treaty was agreed, US Secretary of State James Baker talked of a "new Atlanticism" in Prague in January and advocated greater attention to Basket II.

The Netherlands proposed, in a January 25 address by Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, biannual or annual foreign ministers meetings, summits every two years, working groups of officials between meetings, and an undefined "citizens' forum." Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki called on January 30, in a speech before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, for a "Council of European Cooperation" as a permanent political organ of the CSCE, consisting of ambassadors with staff assisted by a small international secretariat. At the Ottawa Open Skies Conference in February, Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis put forward a plan involving biennial meetings of foreign ministers and a body for parliamentary cooperation. In March, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher proposed a voluntary CSCE conciliation mechanism for dispute resolution, with a small staff to coordinate the mechanism. Denmark suggested a consultative mechanism to resolve disputes. Turkey advocated a permanent secretariat. At their March meeting, NNA foreign ministers advocated progress towards a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the holding of periodic ad hoc consultative meetings at the level of foreign ministers and senior officials. Czechoslovakia proposed a European Security Commission in the framework of the CSCE, initially to fulfil coordination, consultative and verification functions.

By the summer of 1990, the question was not whether CSCE institutions should be created but how extensively they should be developed. After much discussion in NATO (caucus), the West on July 6 put forward its ideas in Paragraph 22 of the London summit declaration, recommending annual head of government or ministerial meetings, biennial CSCE follow-up meetings, a CSCE secretariat, a conflict prevention centre, a mechanism to monitor elections and a CSCE parliamentary body. *Refer to Cdu's agenda.*

During the spring and summer of 1990, Canadian officials continued to flesh out the ideas put forward in the Humber College speech. In Canada's view, facilitating the peaceful settlement of differences lay at the heart of the process of strengthening the CSCE. If the CSCE were to assume a more prominent role in European security, it would have to offer a wide and flexible set of political tools capable of addressing conflict arising from different causes and in different stages of progression, ranging from incipient tension to full-blown war. In May, Canada developed a paper on "Crisis Prevention and Conflict Resolution in Europe" which it shared initially in the NATO caucus, then more broadly with other participating states. Crisis prevention was defined as efforts to defuse tensions between participating states with the aim of avoiding conflict. Conflict resolution was defined as efforts to terminate peacefully and as quickly as possible actual conflict between two or more participating states. Several considerations shaped the Canadian ideas:

- institutionalization should be kept to a minimum;
- the proposals were for addressing conflict *between* states. Separate provisions could

⁷Genscher later proposed a panoply of agencies with responsibilities ranging from human rights and conflict resolution to transportation and environmental protection.