

It is now conventional wisdom that the efforts needed to dismantle Apartheid pale in comparison with the task of dealing with Apartheid's legacies. This volume reinforces the crucial emphasis, spelled out in many well-researched documents, on human resource development through innovative education programmes for a new civil service culture and non-racial management. The shift from aid to victims abroad to training programmes at home proves cost-effective as well as politically necessary. However, Adam and Moodley argue against too partisan an application of assistance in favour of any one of the movements or organizations. If the goal of Canadian policy is to bring about a negotiated accommodation in South Africa, then all legitimate political actors must be included in a successful political settlement. The task of outside intervention is not to select winners or losers in an intense ideological contest but to facilitate democratization and strengthen civil society as a whole.

Canadian involvement is contingent upon and should respond to the specific and ever changing political currents in South Africa. In the transition from confrontation to negotiation, the outcome of a potential accord is not predetermined. Although a widening consensus on constitutional and economic visions has emerged between the ANC and the government, the prospects of peace depend on more than the designs of leaders. The continuing political violence serves as a reminder that the social conditions and unofficial ideologies can wreck any official accord.

Adam and Moodley's comprehensive analysis also covers in depth such controversial topics as Winnie Mandela, the ANC-South African Communist Party alliance, Inkatha and the causes of political violence. The authors sketch options for a Western post-cold war foreign policy toward Southern Africa as a whole. They outline neglected areas of development assistance, such as professional policing, AIDS education, women's rights, low-cost housing and tourism. The romanticism with socialist experiments in Southern Africa is as critically probed as the recolonization of bankrupt frontline states through IMF structural adjustment programmes. Underlying the tough and hard-nosed realism is Adam and Moodley's optimistic assumption that African leaders have