

The July 1991 START Treaty, like SALT II, includes SLBMs within the ceiling of 1,600 SNDVs on each side. In addition, SLBM warheads are included within a sub-ceiling of 4,900 on ballistic missile warheads, and new types of SLBMs (as well as ICBMs) are limited to a maximum of ten warheads each. Long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs are not included within the treaty itself, but are limited to 880 on each side by a separate, politically binding declaration, which also bans the production or deployment of MIRVed nuclear SLCMs.

Two recent but lesser-known US-Soviet agreements touching on naval forces also deserve mention. They are the 1988 ballistic missile launch notification agreement requiring 24 hours' advance notice of the planned date, launch area, and impact area of any test launch of a strategic ballistic missile, including SLBMs; and the 1989 "Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities." Among other things, the latter commits each side to refrain from the use of force against accidental border incursions by the other side's military vessels. Canada and the USSR signed a similar agreement in May 1991.

#### *Other Efforts and Proposals*

Other proposals for naval arms control in the postwar period have tended to emanate from either the United Nations or the Soviet Union. The naval arms race has been an item on the agenda of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) since 1956. In 1985, the report of a UN Group of Experts presented a long list of possible naval arms control and confidence-building measures (CBMs) for consideration, urging that priority be given to nuclear weapons issues. In 1987, a UNDC working group produced another paper emphasizing various naval CBMs, including a multilateral incidents-at-sea agreement and the updating of the 1907 Hague Convention on Mines. However, all of these efforts have been stymied by the United States, which has often stood alone in opposing UN resolutions on the subject.

One naval arms control initiative which did reach the stage of formal negotiations in the postwar period concerned the Indian Ocean. In 1971, the UN General Assembly, by a vote of 61-0 with 55 abstentions (the latter significantly including all of the Permanent Members of the Security Council except China), declared the Indian Ocean to be a "Zone of Peace." The following year, the Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which has been meeting ever since to consider practical measures for the implementation of the Zone.

While this latter effort has proved unsuccessful, US President Carter did eventually embrace an earlier Soviet proposal for negotiated restraints on US and Soviet naval forces in the region. Four rounds of US-Soviet negotiations on the subject, dubbed by some as the "Naval Arms Limitation Talks," actually took place from mid-1977 to early 1978. The two sides reportedly reached an agreement in principle to freeze their military activities in the region at the then current level, while pledging to work for actual reductions in the near future. However, the talks were broken off by the US in protest against increased Soviet military involvement in the Horn of Africa and, despite repeated Soviet entreaties, were never resumed.

The Soviet Union has long been a proponent of naval arms control, promoting measures which, in the view of the US and the other major Western maritime powers, would disproportionately benefit the USSR's own military position at the expense of the West. As early as July 1968, in a memorandum submitted to the UN, the Soviet government called for the "cessation of patrols by missile-carrying submarines with nuclear missiles on board in areas where the borders of parties to such an agreement are within range of such missiles." Similar proposals have been advanced for restrictions on the forward deployment of aircraft carriers and other nuclear-capable naval vessels. In June 1971, the USSR proposed a more general, reciprocal limitation of superpower naval forces in areas "far from their own shores," such as the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.

At about this time, some Western arms control analysts proposed the establishment of "sanctuaries" or "anti-submarine warfare (ASW)-free zones" as an analogue to the ABM Treaty, to help preserve the retaliatory capability of ballistic missile-carrying submarines. This idea was taken up by the USSR during the SALT II negotiations in 1978, and again at the START talks in 1982. However, the US side — confident of the superiority of its own ASW and submarine technologies — successfully resisted such moves.

Proposals for naval confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) were first introduced into the CSCE process by the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) states prior to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and again at the Belgrade Review Conference in 1977-1978. They became a major issue at the Madrid Review Conference in the early 1980s, when the Warsaw Pact states argued strongly for the application of CSBMs to "independent" naval activities, not just those directly connected to land forces. In the end, however, they were forced to back