

CURRENT REFERENCES

- counting rules for ALCMs, with the US proposing ten per bomber, regardless of the number an aircraft is capable of carrying, and the Soviets wanting to count the maximum number each type of bomber is equipped to carry;
- the US demand for a ban on mobile ICBMs, unless adequate ways of verifying their numbers can be found;
- the US proposal not to count ALCMs with ranges of under 1500 km (while the Soviets insist on using the SALT II definition for long-range ALCMs of 600 km);
- the question of heavy ICBM modernization, which the US wants banned; and
- the Soviet insistence on making conclusion of a START agreement contingent upon a Defence and Space Arms agreement, while the US argues against such linkage.

The two sides have agreed that the reductions will take place over seven years. The US has called for cuts to be carried out in a phased manner with intermediate ceilings by agreed dates, while the Soviet Union has supported cuts in two phases, with agreement to hold subsequent negotiations for additional reductions as a condition for signing an accord.

Initially, the talks were set to begin again in mid-February 1989. In December 1988, however, President-elect Bush stated that the negotiations needed to be postponed while his new Administration developed its arms control policies and directions. During this review, a number of decisions were made that would affect the negotiations. In February President Bush named Richard Burt as his chief arms control negotiator for the START talks. This was followed by Mr. Bush's plan to pursue development of both the MX and Midgetman mobile missiles. While this plan faces considerable Congressional opposition, the Bush Administration believes it may strengthen the United States' position at START for limiting mobile missiles. Finally, shortly before the beginning of the new round of talks, the US announced that it would seek to negotiate and implement verification measures for an agreement before completing a new strategic arms treaty.

The superpowers agreed in May to resume negotiations in June. On 19 June the eleventh round began. In early July, US scientists sponsored by the Natural Resources Defense Council, inspected a Soviet warship to demonstrate that the presence of nuclear-armed cruise missiles could be verified. The United States Government was invited to participate in a similar exercise but declined, contending that the tests proved nothing of significance.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Reduction of the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals remains one of the Canadian Government's main arms control priorities. In his opening statement to the United Nations First Committee on 17 October 1988, Ambassador Douglas Roche referred to the issue: