Proposal Abstract J118(A80)

1. **Arms Control Problem:**
    Nuclear weapons - mobile ballistic missiles

2. **Verification Type:**
    (a) Remote sensors
    (b) On-site inspection - selective

3. **Source:**
    Davis, Paul K. "Land-Mobile ICBMs: Verification and Breakout". In
    Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception, pp.
    143-162. Edited by William C. Potter. Boulder, Colorado: Westview
    Press, 1980.

4. **Summary:**
    This paper attempts to discuss arms control problems associated
    with land-mobile ICBMs and with shell-game deployment systems in
    particular. Three verification problems are identified:
    (1) Counting the number of ICBM launchers in overt ICBM deployment
         areas,
    (2) Verifying the absence of ICBM launchers in areas other than overt
         ICBM deployment areas, and
    (3) Coping with the possibility of "breakout".
    Regarding the first problem, designs for shell-game systems are
    already constrained by SALT's provision preventing deliberate
    concealment measures which impede verification. However, there is no
    inherent contradiction between being able to count the other side's
    ICBM launchers and not being able to see them at all times, witness
    the counting of SLBM launchers. The proposed MX basing scheme will
    probably be verifiable for several reasons. First, the MX and its
    launcher will be built slowly and visibly near its deployment area.
    By constraints on production and access to the general areas, it will
    be possible to count the launchers with confidence using NTMs alone.
    In addition, it would be desirable to have provisions for sampling
    upon demand. The US could offer on-site inspection without requiring
    the Soviets to reciprocate providing that they satisfy US verification
    concerns if they deploy a similar shell-game system. Currently,
    however, the MX system is being designed for verification by NTMs.
    Regarding the second verification problem, the author contends
    that it seems unlikely that the Soviets would try to cheat by
    deploying extra missiles in an overt deployment area. Instead, it is
    more appropriate to focus concern on small highly mobile missiles
    outside these areas.
    Regarding the possibilities of "breakout", Davis briefly outlines
    several scenarios. In the context of the shell-game MX system there
    is a possibility of "covert breakout" (i.e. acquiring enough reentry