

(generally pessimistic) insights of this subject into the analysis of CBMs.⁹² Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of the present study to explore the Surprise Attack literature and its relationship with and potential contribution to Confidence-Building thinking. Given the common ground covered by both, there are very good reasons for thinking that it could make a rich contribution to our understanding of Confidence-Building.

The Psychological Dynamics of Confidence-Building

The Type Two Generic Flaw concerns the persistent use – very frequently, the unreflective use – of what were called naive psychological assumptions about the Confidence-Building process (i.e., how Confidence-Building actually works). This often implicit use of *ad hoc* assumptions reflects the serious failure of the literature and Confidence-Building thinking more generally to develop or refer to a satisfactory model of the CBM process. For all the literature's interest in speculating about how best to formulate successful Confidence-Building Measures, there is remarkably little analytic interest in exploring how individual decision makers and groups are affected positively by the particular objectives and mechanisms of those Measures. Intuitively sensible – but by no means correct – assertions about the importance of increasing information and reducing uncertainty about adversaries and their intentions dominate this literature. This essentially intuitive, common-sense approach ignores a great deal of research on the counter-intuitive operation of perception, information processing and decision making, subjects that appear to be very important to an understanding of the Confidence-Building process. The failure to employ

psychological and cognitive scientific findings to understand these dynamics and to construct a working model of the Confidence-Building process is a crucial theoretical and empirical oversight.

It is simply not possible to characterize the Type Two problem in the same manner used to highlight the nature of the Type One Generic Flaw. Neither is it feasible to contrast the literature's "faulty model" of the Confidence-Building process with a convincing collection of "alternative" images or models. In the first place, the Type Two flaw addresses what is in effect the *absence* of a discrete, identifiable model rather than a bad or narrow choice of models. Unlike the Type One flaw where one interpretation of Soviet conventional military forces and doctrine could be challenged by another, the Type Two flaw is about the failure to use *any* real model of the Confidence-Building process. However, not only is there no clearly identifiable process model present in the existing literature, there is no currently available competitive account that can better explain how Confidence-Building works. As was noted earlier in this chapter, the body of ideas that could function as a serious alternative account of how people deal with a wide range of policy problems (including Confidence-Building) is far from being well developed. This fact further frustrates what would hardly be, in any event, a straightforward discussion of process-oriented limitations in the Confidence-Building literature.

Despite these inherent difficulties, there are some observations that we can make – if only in summary form – about decision-making, cognitive processes, misperception, information processing and their potential contribution to an improved understanding of Confidence-Building and how it works. They are intended to be suggestive only and ought not to be asked to bear inordinate critical weight at this stage.

The first point to make concerns the role of "decision-making" in structuring these observations. Although it is certainly not the only way to view the Confidence-Building process, the use of an analytic perspective or approach that is sensitive to the important role of decision-making is helpful in understanding the operation of that process. The primary concerns of Confidence-Building, after all, are clarifying and increasing information about poten-

⁹² Probably the best current treatment of this subject is Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defence Planning* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1982.) Also see Paul Bracken, "Defense Organization and Management" and John H. Maurer and Gordon H. McCormick, "Surprise Attack and Conventional Defence in Europe," both in *ORBIS*, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 253-266 and 107-126 respectively; Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (eds.), *Strategic Military Deception* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982); John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter (eds.), *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise* (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1982); and "Forum: Intelligence and Crisis Forecasting," *ORBIS*, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 817-847.

