Bench is the unexpected resignation of Sir Nathaniel Lindley, of whom it has been said he was the pivot of the Court of Appeal, commanding the full confidence of the public and the profession. He had held judicial office for twenty-five years, and his charm of manner as well as his great ability will long be remembered by those who practised before him. His services, however, will not be entirely lost as he takes his seat in the House of Lords, Lord Morris also being given an hereditary peerage. Sir Nathaniel Lindley is succeeded by Sir Richard Webster, the late Attorney General, who has had one of the most successful careers of the century, the most natural and proper appointment. Sir Robert Finlay, Solicitor General, takes the position thus rendered vacant. He, as his predecessor was, is one of the best lawyers and one of the ablest men that the Bar of England has produced for many years, being, as Lord Beaconsfield said of Lord Cairns, "great in counsel." It thus happens that neither the Attorney General nor the Solicitor General of England are Englishmen, Sir Robert Finlay being a Scotchman born in 1842, and the Right Honorable Edward Carson, the new Solicitor General, being an Irishman born in 1854 and educated at Trinity College, Dublin. He is a man of brilliant talents, as well as having political prominence, and has, at an earlier age than usual, attained the high position which he now occupies.

SUPREME COURT PRACTICE.

Referring to the article by Mr. C. H. Masters, on this subject (ante p. 324), it may be observed that the Ontario Act, 62 Vict., 2nd sess., c. 11, s. 27, seems to settle the question which gave rise to the difference of opinion in the Supreme Court in the case Farquharson v. Imperial Oil Co., now reported in 30 S.C.R. 188, viz., whether there was any intermediate appeal to the Court of Appeal, when the appellant had elected to appeal to a divisional court from the judgment at the trial and his appeal had failed.

The Legislature has now declared that such an appeal has always lain when leave has been given therefor.

Mr. Justice Gwynne's view (concurred in apparently by the full Court), of the Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1897, c. 51, s. 77, as it stood previous to the above amendment, was that no intermediate appeal to the Court of Appeal could, in the case put, be brought even