

change which amounts to a revolution. What is wanted now is not so much impulse as proper direction. It is of the utmost importance that the texts chosen should be the best available, and it is to the question of selection that I propose briefly to address myself.

The work of selection for high schools has, by a kind of accidental arrangement, been performed for some years past by the Senate of the University of Toronto. It is a good thing for the high schools to have the same works in English prescribed for university and intermediate work, and therefore the arrangement referred to is a useful one, but the work of selection is not easy and the Senate has certainly not made the best possible choice for this year. I have no hesitation in saying that neither "Marmion" nor Burke's "Reflections" should have been put on the list, and of the two the "Reflections" is the more objectionable.

A moment's consideration will show the correctness of this view. Taking the "Reflections" first I remark, in the first place, that Burke's style is utterly unsuited for juvenile perusal. I am not going to question his intellectual and rhetorical preëminence or dispute his title to a high position amongst the master minds of all the ages. But that very title is my chief reason for objecting to him. Who would think of prescribing a play of Shakespeare or a book of "Paradise Lost" for the intermediate examination? And yet either of them would be quite as suitable as anything Burke ever said or wrote. But even if his style were suitable the matter of the "Reflections" is not. When he wrote that celebrated pamphlet he was in a morbid frame of mind, and every page of it shows that he was so. It made him the idol of the Court and of the reactionary "Jingos" of his own day, but it inculcates an utterly erroneous and unphilosophical view of one of the great events of history. Why should young Canadians be taught that the French Revolution was a huge crime and nothing more, when they see a French Republic in successful operation in their own day as its result? What sympathy have free people in America with either misgoverning Bourbons or a licentious and blood-sucking aristocracy? It is well known that Fox and other political associates of Burke did in his own day take a sounder and more philosophical view of the Revolution than he did; but he was unable, like them, to separate the temporary and accidental concomitants of the movement from its permanent and beneficent characteristics, and because they would not join in his angry and indiscriminating crusade he cut them off from his friendship. And when we have the whole list of British essayists to select from why have such a pamphlet as Burke's "Reflections" stuck into the hands of our boys and girls!

"Marmion" is, as I have already said, less open to reasonable objection. I take no stock whatever in the charge of immorality recently levelled against it. Those who condemn it as immoral either have never read it or are afflicted with prudency of a most pronounced type. There is some force—but not much—in the objection that it is in some passages offensive to Roman Catholics. Those who feel offended at it on this score are over sensitive, for Scott only makes use, as a poet, of certain local traditions, and he does so without intending the slightest disrespect to the Roman Catholic church. As well might Puritans and Cameronians object to "Old Mortality," or "The Heart of Mid-Lothian," or to Macaulay's "Marston Moor," or Præd's "Naseby." When will people learn that a poem like "Marmion" is a work of art and not a polemical effusion?

My main objection to "Marmion" is that we have already had enough of Scott. The "Lady of the Lake" has been in our hands for four years and it was surely some other poet's turn. Good as Scott's poetry is there is other poetry of the nineteenth century

quite as good, and some of it should have been selected instead of "Marmion." Why not take such a piece as Wordsworth's "Hart-Leap Well" for instance, or his "Resolution and Independence," or his "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality?" Then we have plenty of room to select from Keats, Tennyson, Shelley, or Byron without taking anything objectionable; and why exclude Longfellow and the other American poets, to say nothing of Washington Irving and other writers of essays and sketches? Or, if a Scottish poet must be selected why not try a piece from Burns? Surely something could be culled from Moore worth a careful reading, unless his nationality be an objection.

I hope to see a little more care in the selection of texts for future years, but meanwhile it is absurd to think of totally withdrawing "Marmion" from this year's programme. My own and other objections are too late after the books are in the hands of the pupils and students.

THE BEARINGS OF PSYCHOLOGY ON EDUCATION.*

The functions of intellect may be included under the three heads,—mental comparison, generalization, and retentiveness.

I. MENTAL COMPARISON.—This is the function by which we recognize differences and discover agreements. The like and the unlike are revealed by the same faculty. Consciousness of difference is the beginning of every intellectual exercise. To experience a new impression is to recognize change, and a present experience is recognized as different from or similar to a foregoing, by the faculty which the mind possesses of contrasting and comparing our experiences. The young child cries when the accustomed light is removed from the room, because it has experienced a change of feeling; if the fire in our room is allowed to go out, we are awakened to the fact by a change of feeling. Consciousness of change, then, or discrimination is the starting point of intellect; and further, our intelligence is absolutely limited by our power of discrimination. The recognition of difference must precede memory, as it furnishes material for the retentive faculty. I do not believe that what is known as the development theory of the origin of knowledge is a true one. That theory begins with sensation, which it regards as the simplest state of consciousness, and it makes all the more complex states of consciousness merely developments from this primary state. The adherents of this theory identify sensation and consciousness, and this position I believe to be untenable. Sensation is not consciousness. If we had but a sensuous nature, sensations, as we experience them, would be impossible. We know sensations in contrast. We are conscious of sensations related to one another. This particular sensation is known as distinct from that other. We compare, we contrast, we know the sensations as bearing a certain relation to one another. Now it seems evident that this knowledge is not furnished by sense. Surely the apprehension of relations involves a super-sensuous element. In fact the simplest experience is only possible on the supposition of a higher faculty of mind than sense, viz., the understanding.

Notwithstanding this, it is true, as Prof. Bain puts it, that "the blank of sensation is a blank of memory." Sense furnishes the material of knowledge, and if nothing be felt, of course nothing can be remembered. It is further true that the number and variety of our stored-up recollections depend on the exactness and delicacy of our recognition of differences. The power of discrimination is not alike in all persons, and this in a great measure accounts for disparity in intellectual character, and variety in likings and pursuits, and it is of importance to note this native inequality in order to predestine the child to a particular profession or calling; but this

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