

There was nothing *accidental* about this act leading in slaughter, it was the *natural, inevitable result of a criminal deed* of the most brutal kind we ever read of. However, the jury we suppose, thought kicking a woman a not especially culpable act, and so one of the most cruel, dastardly murders ever committed is ranked along with the crime which a man may commit by sheer accident, loss of memory, or nervous excitement! A switchman sleeping at his post, overcome by excessively long hours, or a druggist, worried perhaps by some domestic trouble, may in a second's lack of care, commit manslaughter, these two men without a trace of evil intention are judged to have committed the very same crime as Buckley, who first knocked his victim down by a chair, and then kicked her to death! That is law, but it is not justice.

Another point this case imperatively forces upon the public attention. The murderer Buckley is only 26 years of age, yet he had 29 convictions recorded against him! Twice he has been convicted of felony and sent to the penitentiary. Yet this human wild beast who had literally prowled about seeking his prey for fifteen years, never having done a day's work except in prison, was never interfered with by the police, but known to be living on crime, was given full leave and license to carry on his calling as a thief! That it seems is also "according to law," but it is a gross outrage on the liberty and rights of innocent citizens for the police to pay no regard to men whom they know to be professional robbers, and whose calling they could destroy if they were so directed by the authorities. As we have said before, the law is becoming more and more a terror chiefly to those who do well, and the end will be that unless more respect is paid to public safety and less maudlin respect shown to criminals, that Judge Lynch will very soon be called upon to deal with those whose profession is to make war on society.

KANT.*

DR. WATSON has, in our judgment, done a most useful, almost a necessary, work, in preparing his volume of selections from Kant, and he has done it about as well as any one could do it. Whatever people may think of the German philosophies in general, or of the philosophy of Kant in particular, at least every days experience is making it clearer that no one can deal, in a competent manner, with the subject of modern thought, unless he begins with Kant. And this for various reasons. It is not merely that Kant is the starting point in the great current of thought which was guided onward by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; but he was the origin of various other tendencies and schools—it is enough to mention the not unimportant name of Schopenhauer; and moreover there is no considerable school or thinker that does not show traces of his influence. Even the Scottish School, in the presence of Sir William Hamilton, was almost

*Selections from Kant, by Prof. John Watson, LL.D.

revolutionized by the influence of Kant; and so was the philosophy of France in the teaching of Cousin.

Now, Kant has hitherto been studied chiefly in two ways. One class of students have been contented to learn his doctrines through historians and expositions. No one has a right to blame them. We learn most things in this way. But a student will hardly gain a knowledge of Kant's way of thinking in this manner, nor will he so readily understand the subsequent development of philosophic thought under his successors.

On the other hand, the study of the original works of Kant in their entirety involves an amount of labour which will ordinarily be undergone only by those who are professionals or experts. And, moreover, it must be said that Kant suffers less than most authors from the curtailment of his writings. Professor Max Muller, the latest translator of the Critique of Pure Reason, speaks of the style of Kant as being easy; and this may be so in the view of so distinguished a linguist. But ordinary readers will hardly come to this conclusion. Besides which, it is often found that Kant's first statement of his argument is not only adequate, but much clearer than his subsequent application of it. It is, therefore, a great gain to have had the principle portions not only of his greatest work, just named, but also parts of the Metaphysic of Ethics, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Judgment made accessible to students in this manner.

As regards the translation, Professor Watson has availed himself of the labours of his predecessors; and has adopted those English equivalents for German terms which are now sanctioned by common use. He has also had the advantage of having his work revised by Professor E. Caird, of Glasgow, who is second to no one as a Kantian Scholar. We think that the translator has shown practical judgment in the selections which he has made from the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, which differ considerably as many of our readers will know.

We are informed that an earlier and less perfect form of this volume has, for some time, been in use in American Colleges: we cannot doubt, that in its new and improved form, it will soon be used wherever the philosophy of Kant is studied.

THE BISHOP OF MANCHESTER'S ADDRESS AT THE CHURCH CONGRESS.

THE following is a brief abstract of the President's Address:—

The President said they had been frequently told of late that Church Congresses had had their day. But if they abandoned them, could they be sure that all their more important functions would be adequately discharged by existing organizations? For his part he could not think so. Certainly no Diocesan Conference could express the opinion or represent the feeling of the Church of England. If anything could supersede the Church Congress it must

be the newly-appointed House of Laymen. But not to dwell on the fact that there was as yet no House of Laymen in the Province of York, he believed that the necessary relation of such a body with Convocation incapacitated it from undertaking the special work of a Church Congress. The proper office of Convocation was the making of laws. The matter of primary importance in our time was not so much the course of political and ecclesiastical legislation, as the creation of a reasonable and righteous public opinion. Real influence would be exerted in the future, not so much by those who made laws, as by those who created the public opinion which finds expression in those laws. It seems to him that Church Congresses, which were purely deliberative bodies, might well pass lightly over the minor questions of Church politics, questions of property, privilege, discipline, and the like, leaving them to be carefully debated and determined by Parliament and Convocation. But when the question was a large one, one that concerned the essentials of their faith, or the dearest interests of their life, then he thought that in the first place, and for some time, it might be more safely and profitably debated by a purely deliberative body like the Church Congress. It had been the wisdom of the Subjects Committee of the present Congress that they had given prominence to subjects of such universal interest as present difficulties to thought, which required conscientious care in treatment. It was the opinion of some, he knew, that the duty of forming public opinion upon religious questions might be more effectually performed by the press than by any conference whatever. He did not deny that the press had its place, and that a most important one, in the discharge of this necessary function. But however effective the press might be as a public teacher, it was not, in this capacity, without its obvious defects; and seeing that it was the natural tendency of a Congress to favor the growth among its members of a judicial temper and mutual consideration, he must maintain that, whatever its shortcomings, it had some advantages over even the press as an instrument for the creation of enlightened public opinion. Supposing, however, it be granted that when great religious questions were to be debated, the Church Congress by its constitution was specially adapted for taking them in hand, it might still be doubted whether there were any such questions at the present day which were ripe for consideration. He would endeavour to show, by taking two specimens of the subjects, that they had been called together to discuss what were called 'burning questions,' questions which pressed for immediate theoretic, if not for immediate practical solution. There was the question how far it might be wise and right for the clergy to make known the well-established results of biblical criticism in their ordinary teaching. No doubt this was a very grave question, for it was impossible to speak freely of the results of the most reverent criticism without calling in question certain views of biblical inspiration. The question to be considered was whether the time had not