

that a man ought to be honest and speak the truth, and denying that he ought to steal and lie.

Thus it appears, first, that in popular estimation to call an action right is equivalent to saying that it ought to be done ; and, secondly, that if we try to frame a scientific definition of right actions, and for that purpose to amend the rough list of right actions furnished by common opinion, we cannot retain any act in the list without assenting to the proposition that it ought to be done, or remove any from the list without denying this proposition.

It appears then, that "actions which we ought to do," if not the whole, must at least be a part of the definition of right actions ; and with this Mr. Herbert Spencer, whose views differ very materially from ordinary utilitarianism, would seem to be in substantial agreement when he argues¹ that the true moral reason why acts that promote happiness should be done is derived not from their extrinsic, but from their intrinsic effects ; that is, from the fact that they do promote happiness.

If, then, right acts are acts that we ought to do, the next step in the inquiry will be to ask what is meant by the assertion "I ought." And first we may notice that it is used in many cases where no moral judgment is involved, but always with reference to some end expressed or implied. Thus, in speaking of a game, "You ought to check with the queen," *i.e.*, in order to win the game ; and in speaking of a business, "The accounts ought to be more carefully kept," *i.e.*, in order to conduct the business more successfully. And even in speaking of immoral acts, we may say, "The thief ought to have been more quiet," *i.e.*, to avoid detection.

Thus, in reference to any particular end admitted to be desirable, an action which tends to further that end is right, or what we ought to do ; but in order to define some class of action as not merely relatively, but absolutely or universally right, we require to assign some end which is absolutely and universally desirable. The utilitarian finds this end in the happiness of all, and asserts that every other proposed

¹ *The Data of Ethics*, p. 120.