reat them with contempt, but he did not nstitution refuse to mention them. Under the law ng. But the as it then stood, he had automatically lost his resignatis seat in the House of Commons when ue" of Lot he accepted the Premiership; so he was rather to not in the House to answer Mr. King (if t say muche had been, the result of the final division might have been very different). Outside the House, he performed at least two surgical dissections of King's case, one on he hustings, one in Maclean's Magazine two weeks before the election.

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This was not enough. The falseness of King's case was "transparent" to Mr. Diefenbaker; it is, and was, transparent o me; it is precisely because it was so transparent to Meighen that he could scarcely believe that any grown-up person could swallow such nonsense. Elaborate ative from refutation seemed to him as superfluous s may haw as if he had been dealing with a believer in a flat earth.

> Mr. Diefenbaker pays eloquent tribnte to Meighen's character, intellect and command of English. He calls the 1927 defence of his Hamilton speech "the best political speech that I have ever heard". Curiously, he seems to have forgotten what the Hamilton speech said. It did not propose "that never again should Canadian men be sent overseas except by the declaration of Parliament". What it did propose, and Meighen made this crystal lear, then and in 1927, was that never gain should troops be sent overseas extept after a general election had endorsed he sending.) Clearly, however, he feels hat Meighen lacked political sense, and, worse, was out of tune with the times this latter, I think, was true of his later years, but not of his earlier).

Kicking and screaming

If Meighen moved right as he grew older, R. B. Bennett moved left, and, in his amous "New Deal" measures, started he process of, as Mr. Deifenbaker says, dragging the national Conservative Party kicking and screaming into the Twentieth Century", a process that Mr. Diefenbaker found thoroughly congenial, and that he was to continue. Mr. Diefenbaker had not supported Bennett at the convention that those him; he feared his "close identififation with the established economic inerests". But "I had not reckoned with either the independence of his character r the strong influence of his Methodist onscience". This last is a penetrating fomment. Bennett proposed his "New Deal" because he had undergone a social and political "conversion".

Mr. Diefenbaker pays a deserved tribute to the social legislation Bennett passed, and suggests that, had he gone to the country on it immediately, he might have won. I think he has forgotten Bennett's serious illness while the bills were actually before Parliament. But the chief reason for the rout that actually took place must, as Mr. Diefenbaker says, be laid at the feet of Mr. H. H. Stevens, or of Bennett's inability or unwillingness to keep Stevens in the Cabinet. The two men wanted the same things; their parting was a tragedy for both, and for the Conservative Party, and for the country.

The genuineness of Bennett's "conversion" has often been doubted. Mr. Diefenbaker gives us striking evidence of its depth and permanence. When Mr. Drew was being suggested for the Conservative leadership, he says, the Kingston Conservative Association urged Bennett to "get behind him: he is going places". Bennett declined: "George Drew and Conservative Party not going same places". This is one of the many instances in which Mr. Diefenbaker shows his imperfect sympathy with Drew, though he acknowledges Drew's brilliance, parliamentary skill, wide knowledge and distinguished war record. He records that one reason Drew was chosen leader in 1948 was that many Conservatives believed that under him the Union Nationale would be "behind our Party. They did not say how far behind us". Nonetheless, once Drew became leader, Diefenbaker had, he says, no ground for complaining of any unfairness.

Pipeline omission

The brief account of the Pipeline Debate lists five "valiant fighters" on the Opposition side. The list does not include Stanley Knowles - which is rather like describing Hamlet without mentioning the Prince of Denmark. There is also a curious confusion of dates. The Speaker's decision to accept Mr. Cameron's motion of privilege came on Thursday, not Friday, and his subsequent "proposition" that the House should go back to where it had been the night before came on Friday, June 1, not Monday; indeed, to most of us who were involved (a letter of mine to the Ottawa Journal was part of the basis of Mr. Cameron's motion), the day remains etched on memory as "Black Friday".

Mr. Diefenbaker has, justly, much to say of his defence of civil liberties, both of the individual and of the persecuted minory. I wish, however, that he had given more detail about his support for the Japanese Canadians. The course

H. H. C. Stevens to blame for rout of Bennett

Hamletwithout the Prince of Denmark