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The Volunteer Review,

AND

MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1875.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as Communications intended for publication, must, invariably, be *pre-paid*. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and at the corner the words "Printer's Copy" written and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed thereon will pay the postage.

LIEUT. J. B. VINTER, of Victoria, and Captain H. V. EDMONDS of New Westminster, are our authorized Agents for British Columbia.

MAJOR GENERAL T. B. COLLINSON, R.E., has added to the military literature of the day, a most valuable lecture, which was delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, and is republished in another page.

This grand historical episode in the history of not only England, but the civilized world, has always since the final action off the Goodwins, 8th August, 1588, possessed a fascination for the student of history, the poet politician, the seaman and military strategist; and the gallant lecturer in the able memoir now before our readers has added to that interest for all by the able historical exegesis he has given and the lucid manner in which the tactical and strategical deductions drawn from that great Naval operation are applied to modern necessities.

In the course of the necessary comparisons General COLLINSON brings out some startling statistical facts, which it would be well for all army reorganisers in the British Empire to study closely. The pay of the militia soldier was equal to four shillings sterling per day

of present value with a rate of pay for non-commissioned of forty shillings sterling per month, and a ration of 2 lbs. meat, 1½ lbs. bread, and 1 gallon of beer per diem. *Universal service* was then the general rule; there was no talk of ballots or conscription, every man capable was expected to fight and answered the call of duty without hesitation. It is true the *Feudal Militia Soldier* was not just then well trained—but this is to be traced to those series of political crisis or revolutions through which the country was passing—and which made it dangerous to put too highly trained military mechanism in the hands of the Great Peers—trade had not yet sapped the manliness of the British people, and the yeoman, as well as the peasant, the hardy fisherman, as well as the peer, were imbued with that patriotic spirit which enabled a poor country with barely four millions of inhabitant to contend successfully with the greatest military and naval power of the day backed by the resources and value of sixteen millions.

Political economy, as a science, was not understood in that age, but it was practically applied in providing for the human power of defence and distributing a part of the accumulated wealth of the country amongst its defenders.

The provisions made for the remuneration of the soldier and seaman in proportion to the revenue was more than sixteen times what it is at the present day, while the actual value of the commercial interests to be guarded was not a thousandth part as great. The lesson taught by this is that if the people of England, or indeed, any other people, want an army it must be paid for, and that is a prime requisite in its organization. It will not do to spend £15,000,000 sterling annually of which only *one-fifth* reaches the fighting man instead of four-fifths.

From the lecture it would appear that modern knowledge has thrown no new light on the science of strategy—it has only made it more easy of access—for we find distribution of forces to meet an invasion very little different from what a Royal Commission would advise (or has advised) in the present day.

General COLLINSON has proved beyond doubt the necessity of having small handy war vessels armed in the most powerful manner to the confusion of those naval theorists whose efforts have been directed to produce a class of unwieldy nondescripts utterly unmanageable in a sea way, and about as efficient as the galliasses and galleons of the Armada.

He summarises the lessons to be learnt from the Armada as follows:

1. *Decentralisation.*
2. *The preservation of the martial discipline of the country.*
3. An abundant supply of efficient seamen, and truly says, 'The spirit of a nation lies in its aristocracy, but its strength rests in the people'—thus pointing out the folly

of the Whig-Radicals in taking the control of the militia out of the hands of the landed gentry; which is further evidenced by the assertion 'that one of the greatest securities of these islands is in a large and well organised militia.'

The concluding axiom is invaluable, because throughout the whole of the lecture care has been taken to show that the efficiency of the seamen who manned the British fleet on this occasion was attained in the mercantile marine of the country.

"The one paramount lesson to be learned by our war statesmen from the story of the Armada is the preservation of a race of efficient seamen."

This deserves to be written in letters of gold over the speakers chair in the British House of Commons, and the lecturer has pointed out how it can be done as, the *Royal Navy*, so called in those days, supplied 35 ships of 12,690 tons, carrying 658 guns, and manned by 6,361 men; the *armed Merchant Navy* 161 ships, 20,000 tons, and 400 guns (this last only estimated), manned by 9,070 tons—they bore more than a share of the fight—and we have only to follow their example in training the crews of our merchant vessels.

THE Royal United Service Institution in the laudable desire to promote the great public interests involved in the problem of military organization, offered a gold medal for the best essay on "The best mode of providing recruits and forming reserves for the British Army, taking into consideration its varied duties in peace and war."

That prize was recently awarded by their chosen referees of the council of the Institution—General Sir WILLIAM CODRINGTON, Lieut. General Sir JOHN ST. GEORGE, and Major General SMITH, M.P., to Captain H. W. L. HINE, R.A. F.S.S., the result of whose labors are before us in a pamphlet of 40 pages published by the Institution.

After an introduction in which the fortunate essayist pays a just and merited compliment to the courtesy and attention of Mr. T. D. SULLIVAN, Librarian of the Institution—he gives a sketch of the subjects which his memoir embraces as follows: "The first part is an historical sketch of the English system of voluntary enlistment from which I draw this conclusion, that the system never was a success—that it is breaking down at the present time, and that it will in all human probability collapse altogether before very long."

"The second part is an enquiry into the respective merits of the four possible systems of recruiting from which I draw this conclusion, that the compulsory is the only system will satisfy the exigencies of our case as far as the Home Army is concerned."

"In the third part I propose for the Home Army a scheme of universal conscription without substitution or dotation."