prominent; fourthly, that the absence of remedies in the bailor against third persons, again coincident with the last-named period, finds its most logical explanation in this principle; and lastly, that this principle has been of no mean importance at various other stages of our legal history.

All through the course of our legal history runs the note of dubitation with regard to incorporeal rights. "If we ascribe possession to a hirer of land this will not debar us from ascribing a certain sort of possession or seisin to the letter; . . . but it is otherwise with chattels. As between letter and hirer . . . we must make up our minds, and if we concede possession to the one, we must, almost of necessity, deny it to the other." A transfer of a "right" was inconceivable without the transfer of the thing to which it related. Thus the sheriff who was to seize an advowson for the King had to go into the church and make a declaration there to that effect. The transfer of an advowson conferred but an "imaginary seisin," so that, if the transferee transferred to a third person before he had had an opportunity of proving his title to the advowson by presenting, the transfer to the third person was void, and the next presentment would be by the original transferor.

Finally we have the following common law rules:

The lord had no warship of an infant whose ancestor, being a tenant, died out of seisin (temp. Edward III.).

The lord could not bring an action escheat against the disseisor of a tenant who (subsequently to being disseised) died without heirs (temp. Henry VII.).

Until 1833 seisin during coverture was an essential condition precedent of dower.

Until 1833 the rule of inheritance was "seisina facit stipitem."

Until 1838 a right of entry was inalienable inter vivos or by will.

Until 1845 land could be transferred only by the symbolic act of livery of seisin [or some special statutory equivalent.]

Until 1845 feoffments operated by wrong.