

*The Budget—Mr. Blackmore*

Again, on August 18, 1946, Truman issued an executive order saying that China was not to be allowed to acquire any "surplus" American weapons "which could be used in fighting a civil war", which could only mean a war against the communists. Meanwhile, of course, the war with the communists was going on. When in the summer of 1946 Chiang tried to buy one and a half billion rounds of ammunition from the United States, the state department informed him that export licences would be refused—the only nation on the face of the earth that could not buy arms and ammunition from the United States, as far as I know. Britain, presumably under United States pressure, followed suit. There was no other source of supply—Utley, pages 13 and 14. Imagine the injustice of a person who maintains that Chiang was driven out of China by the Chinese, in the face of things like that.

Thus far, Mr. Speaker, I have maintained that the fall of China to the Russian communist conspiracy was the result of the work of American citizens operating in the United States or directly under the instructions of United States officials. May I now give some quotations in support of my contention? These quotations are from some of the finest authorities in the world. I quote from "The Iron Curtain Over America" by John Beaty, page 116:

Thus President Truman, Ambassador Marshall, and the state department prepared the way for the fall of China to Soviet control.

Again from the same authority, on the same page:

They sacrificed Chiang and they destroyed—

Notice that there is no doubt about it.

—a friendly government, which was potentially our strongest ally in the world, stronger even than the home island of maritime Britain in this age of air and guided missiles.

In "The Iron Curtain Over America", page 146, we find this reference to Chiang:

His failure on the mainland had resulted directly from our—

That is the United States.

—withholding of ammunition and other supplies.

I give another quotation, again from "The Iron Curtain Over America", page 146:

Chiang's forces—despite frequent belittlings in certain newspapers and by certain radio commentators—were and are by no means negligible.

Again I quote from the same authority, page 115:

Although the Soviet was pouring supplies and military instructors into communist-held areas, Mr. Truman said that the United States would not offer "military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife".

An ugly picture, is it not, Mr. Speaker? May I give another quotation. This one is from "The China Story" by Utley, page 19:

This threat of complete withdrawal of American interest in the outcome of the conflict usually forced the generalissimo to give way and halt his victorious offensives to the benefit of the communists.

Once more may I recall that monstrous lie of Dean Acheson, that nothing the United States could have done or left undone could have changed the outcome? Where in all history have you heard a worse lie than that?

Even after four years of the most inane betrayal on the part of the United States administration—mark you, it is the administration and not the people of the United States, who were kept in complete ignorance of all that was going on; it was the administration and certain men like Acheson, Lattimore, Hiss and other men in the administration—when Chiang, in December, 1949, withdrew to Formosa he still was a power with which to reckon.

On May 10, 1949, General Claire Chennault, a military man of many years' experience, giving his views in his "summary of present communist crisis in Asia" set forth that some 150 million people in southern and western China could supply "effective resistance to the communist advance". Chennault wrote, and I quote from his summary:

Both the people and their leaders are prepared to resist the communists and will in any case resist whether we help them or not. But what we give in aid will make the difference between a hopeless and an effective resistance.

Here was a man who had been right out there fighting and knew all about it.

When in June, 1950, the United States seventh fleet was ordered into the Formosa strait, Chiang had a navy that was "quite an efficient force", with power to intercept and capture communist supply ships going up to Korea, according to Ambassador William Bullitt, testifying before the McCarran committee hearings on I.P.R. on April 8, 1952. Chiang had an air force of between 200 and 250 planes. Chiang, from Formosa, with his 200 to 250 planes was dropping ammunition to unsubdued nationalist troops on the Chinese mainland, 1,250,000 of them—see Beaty, page 146. He was bombing communist concentrations and was making hit and run raids on communist-held ports. He was intercepting supplies being sent to the communists from the United States and Britain—see Beaty, page 146. These supplies included, for example, 2,500 tons of Malayan rubber per month—see Beaty, page 146.

Chiang was holding two communist armies in China occupied in watching him—see