

this credit—a substantial measure of this credit—is due to the wise policy and to the economical and efficient administration of my right hon. friend who leads the Government.

The next paragraph in the Speech refers to the International Commission. Before dealing with that, let me say a word with respect to two of the more prominent members of that Commission who were stricken by the hand of death before their labours were consummated, I refer to Senator Dingley and to Lord Herschell. When Senator Dingley died, we could not but notice that the sorrow for his death was as widespread and just as heartfelt in England and in Canada as in the United States. And when Lord Herschell died we could not but notice, also, that the sorrow and sympathy expressed in the United States were even greater and deeper than for their own illustrious statesman. That shows that the dividing line between us all is a narrow one; in fact, may hardly be said to exist. It shows that we are all members of one brotherhood, of one common Anglo-Saxon family. Let me make another remark. It was said of the late lamented Sir John A. Macdonald that before he died he expressed the wish that he might die at the post of duty. I believe that wish was gratified. And, so far as Lord Herschell is concerned, it may be said of him also that he died in harness—died in the performance of a labour of love that he had undertaken on behalf of the people of Canada—died in the performance of a duty that he owed to the Sovereign and to the Empire—died, too, in performing or in the attempt to perform, one of the noblest tasks that can be undertaken by mortality, the task, in the first place, of smoothing away the differences and of settling permanently the disputes between Canada and the United States, and the still higher and nobler task of endeavouring to bring into greater harmony and co-operation the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race.

We have to regret, Mr. Speaker, that we are not in possession of all the facts which would enable us to fairly judge of the work and result of the commission. We have to remember that the mouths of the commissioners are sealed, and that the door of the commission chamber was closed. But, Sir, there are some things of which we may say we are fairly cognizant. We know that the commission sat for six months, or nearly so, and that our commissioners made an honest and earnest, and, I may add, a persistent effort to settle the various causes of differences existing between the two nations. In making that effort, they have met with the approbation of our whole people without regard to party. Another statement I may fairly make is, that our commissioners laid down the policy that we want to settle all the existing differences, that we want, for the purpose of settlement, to pool these differences. That I think was a wise course to pursue, because to leave one subject unsettled, or one cause of irritation

unremoved, would be nearly as bad as to leave all outstanding questions in their present condition. I think I am justified in drawing this further conclusion. When the commissioners adjourned, they stated that there was one cause of difference between them, namely, that with regard to the Alaska boundary. It is a fair inference to draw, that upon all the questions under consideration, there was either an agreement, or there was such an interchange of views between the different members of that commission, as that they knew they could come to an ultimate agreement—a fair compromise—that they could settle for instance, the question of the North-east Atlantic fisheries, the question of the Alien Labour Law, the question of the Alaska seal fishery, and also that they could arrive at a reasonable reciprocity treaty between the two countries. Before we can either give credit or impute blame, it is necessary that we should know exactly where the disagreement between the American and Canadian commissioners arose. The statement made by them to the public was—and we are bound to assume it correct—that they differed on the question of the Alaska boundary, that they could not come to any understanding regarding the terms of the old treaty between England and Russia, that they could not agree upon the commencement of the line of delimitation, or upon its location. Especially, they could not agree as to whether that line of delimitation ran across the Lynn Canal or round the head of it. Then the question of arbitration arose. The United States commissioners consented to submit the matter to arbitration but only upon terms which it was impossible for the British and Canadian commissioners to agree to. The first divergence was this: The Americans said: We will submit this matter to arbitration; but, so far as Dyea and Skagway are concerned, as well as the territories now occupied therewith, whatever the result of the arbitration—whether it shall be ascertained that these towns are within British territory or not—nevertheless, they shall be deemed to be American territory. That was on the principle of "Tails I win; heads you lose." That was a proposition that could not possibly be accepted, in reason, by the Canadian commissioners, our representatives could not withdraw from the arbitration, what seems to me to be the very essence of the dispute. Our commissioners were not willing to give up, and they refused to give up, any portion of British territory or British territorial right, and, in taking that stand, they vindicated the honour and independence of Canada.

There was another cause of difference, and that was, that the American commissioners proposed that there should be three arbitrators on each side, but no umpire. Our commissioners took the grounds that this was virtually no arbitration at all, as it did not provide for a finality. The probability would be that the Canadian representatives would