

recognition that change, as an essential part of the dynamic of interdependence, is both inevitable and essential.

**SALT process**

A precondition for moving ahead at the second Special Session is the resumption of arms-limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Their recent decision, as announced in the General Assembly, to begin talks next month on theatre nuclear forces in Europe should give a positive impulse to our work. We look forward to those talks leading to a treaty which would restore the balance at the lowest possible level.

Canada therefore warmly welcomes the statement made here last week by the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow, that the United States will be ready to resume negotiations on strategic arms early in 1982. We are particularly encouraged by the emphasis being placed on reductions and on the need for co-operation in ensuring mutual confidence. We look for an equally positive attitude on the part of the Soviet Union. In a number of statements, my Prime Minister has attached the highest priority to the resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process. It is to us of paramount importance that these critical negotiations, once resumed, move forward with the objective not just of limiting, but of reducing, these forces.

It is our view, moreover, that one of the most important factors governing the prospects for success at this year's deliberations, and at the Second Special session itself, will be the degree to which the atmosphere generated by these talks, even in their anticipation, will contribute to creating an atmosphere of international confidence.

We believe that the international concern expressed about the nuclear arms race would be incomplete if the dangers of further horizontal proliferation were not given sufficient weight. The implications of the nuclear dimension for regional tensions recently took concrete shape in the Middle East. With this as an example, and with the prospect of further regional proliferation still a matter that cannot be easily dismissed, we are convinced that greater efforts must be directed towards strengthening the international non-proliferation régime and the international instruments which support it. In this regard, we warmly welcome the ratification by Egypt of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, announced earlier this year.

**Verification procedures**

Canada believes that there is no substitute for the painstaking negotiation of verifiable agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. I would underline the word "verifiable". Verification is not a tactic to delay or prevent success in negotiations. More than ever before it is a prerequisite for their success. Canada has for many years sought the development of international verification procedures wherever these are required to supplement national mechanisms in order to enhance confidence that the parties are complying with the terms of agreements. Yet even in this body and elsewhere, ingrained habits of confrontation continue to persist — the hortatory over the practical, the seeking of the propaganda advantage and in some instances, the launching of proposals patently devoid of any hope of realization. We regard verification as one of the most important tests of the seriousness of a proposal. Verification