

personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies" had been sent from North Vietnam into South Vietnam "with the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks directed against the armed forces and administration" of South Vietnam, and that the North Vietnamese authorities had allowed North Vietnamese territory to be used "for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the South aimed at the overthrow of the administration" in South Vietnam. The Commission also reported that South Vietnam had received military aid from the United States in quantities in excess of those permitted by the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and had made military arrangements with the United States which amounted to a factual military alliance. The Commission recommended that all violations of the Cease-Fire Agreement should cease in order to avert the threat of the resumption of open hostilities. The recommendations of the Commission were not heeded. North Vietnam's campaign of infiltration and subversion increased, as did the entry of United States military personnel and equipment; and by the beginning of 1965, with the commitment of United States combat troops to the support of South Vietnam, the war had passed into a form not very different from that preceding the cease-fire in 1954. It continues to intensify.

With its special message of 1962, to which I have just referred, the International Commission passed into a new stage of its existence. We had to face the fact that the 1954 settlement had broken down completely and that a new war in Vietnam was confronting the international community. North Vietnam, which had signed the Cease-Fire Agreement, had, according to the evidence of the International Commission, violated the cease-fire in an attempt to establish the control over all of Vietnam which it had expected to achieve through the elections envisaged in the Final Declaration. South Vietnam, which did not consider itself bound by an agreement that it had not signed (but which had undertaken not to use force to resist the implementation of the cease-fire clauses), had also violated the cease-fire provisions. Progressively, the Cease-Fire Agreement had been eroded to a point where the International Commission remained its only functioning component.

The Canadian Government, although it recognized the futility of supervising a Cease-Fire Agreement which was being breached by both Vietnamese governments, considered that every effort had to be made to bring about an end of the war. We saw in the International Commission a symbol of the 1954 settlement, a possible channel for negotiations between the opposing forces in Vietnam, and the possible nucleus of some future settlement. Questions are sometimes raised in Canada about the desirability of continuing Canadian participation in the Commission. We have weighed the various aspects of the problem very carefully and we continue to believe that we should maintain our participation.

None of the interested parties have suggested that the International Commission should be withdrawn or that its mandate be cancelled. Furthermore, the Commission stands as a symbol of the 1954 Cease-Fire Agreement and can be considered as an indication of the continuing interest of the Geneva powers in the situation. Most important of all, however, is our belief that, in the right circumstances, the Commission might be able to make a positive contribution to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam issue.