

We were aware at the outset that we would have to rely on the ability and good offices of the Secretary-General to carry out both the letter and the spirit of the draft resolution. I will not attempt to recount in detail the long and intensive negotiations which went into the formulation of the seven power draft presented on August 18. We will look at the draft for a moment, but in a general way.

May I say that the draft was revised at least seven times as to context, which will indicate the care given to the particular views advanced by the various countries and groups of countries from time to time. At one time we believed we had a workable resolution, but then the attitude of the distinguished delegate from Jordan certainly surprised us and seemed to make it impossible for us to carry out the design which we had prepared for our resolution. Members of the committee may recall that the representative of Jordan in his statement to the General Assembly appeared to reject any substantial role for the United Nations within Jordan, and he seemed to oppose on behalf of his Government the presence of any United Nations representatives or any United Nations instrumentality within the territorial boundaries of his country with one possible exception and one had to look through a magnifying glass to discern that exception. However, that roadblock was removed within 24 hours, when the Jordanian representative subsequently modified his position.

The essential elements of the resolution which we co-sponsored may be described in these words. It reaffirmed that all member states of the United Nations should refrain from action which might impair the freedom, independence or integrity of any state, which might cause civil strife or subvert the will of the people in any state; and it called upon all member states to observe these obligations especially in the area in question. It requested the Secretary-General to make such practical arrangements after consultation with the governments concerned as were deemed necessary, and who could do this better than the Secretary-General? But he would have to do it on the spot.

May I refer for the moment to the U.S.S.R. resolution in this context. That resolution instructed the Secretary-General to go to Lebanon and Jordan for the purpose of supervising the withdrawal of troops, and nothing more. But our resolution, and I am not giving away any secrets when I say this, met with the entire satisfaction of the Secretary-General, although it imposed a great load upon him. In our final resolution the Secretary-General was to make such practical arrangements as he, in consultation with the governments concerned, might find would adequately serve to help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the circumstances obtaining at the time in those countries.

In our resolution the question of withdrawal of the troops of the United States and the United Kingdom was not the subject of a specific provision, but in the preambular clause it was noted by the General Assembly that declarations were addressed to the President of the General Assembly in the letters