

by retreating RGF troops. On the 20th of April the 16 UN military observers were withdrawn from Butare at which point there was no further UNAMIR presence in Butare nor elsewhere in Rwanda apart from Kigali. The previous day, April 19th, lightly armed units of the Presidential Guard flew in from Kigali, arrested and killed the Préfet, and initiated broad based massacres¹³ immediately subsequent to the departure of the 16 UNMOs.

In conclusion, Operation Turquoise and this brief 'what if' scenario provide a prima facie case for concluding that rapid international action could have substantially mitigated the genocide and massive population displacement that occurred. The previous section determined that the international community also had sufficient early warning. The grounds are there to proceed with a more in-depth examination of what lessons the international community can draw from Rwanda.

¹³ see p.4, "Genocide in Rwanda April-May 1994", Human Rights Watch, and p.10 "Rwanda: Mass murder by government supporters and troops in April and May 1994", Amnesty International 23 May 1994 AFR 47/11/94