

In November 1990, after some unilateral Soviet withdrawals of conventional forces from Eastern Europe, the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty (the post-Cold War successor to the MBFR talks) was signed. It mandated massive reductions in conventional forces in NATO nations and the by then unraveling Warsaw Pact. Its provisions included broad intrusive verification measures and transparency in future posture decisions. By September 1994, "over 18,000 items of treaty limited equipment (TLE) had been destroyed including 6,000 from the Russian Federation," with "no evidence of a concerted effort by any party to cheat or intentionally mislead inspection teams."⁵³ Here again, the agreement seemed to favour NATO for whom the large Warsaw Pact land armies had been the prime strategic threat.

The end of the Cold War also allowed for real reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, once more on terms that benefitted the United States. Under START I, not only were overall levels brought down but the Soviets agreed to cut in half their heavy SS-18 ICBM arsenal, an objective Washington had been seeking since the 1970s. Under the unratified START II agreement, overall levels are to be reduced to 3,500 warheads. Under the START III proposals, Presidents Clinton and former president Yeltsin agreed to negotiate reduced warhead levels to about 2,000 each.⁵⁴ More importantly from the American view, START II eliminates all MIRVed ICBMs, including the remaining SS-18s. The treaty however, leaves both sides able to deploy MIRVed Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and this provides the United States with an edge. Its fourteen Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs), which carry the Trident II D-5 SLBM constitute half of America's deployed strategic warheads. Moreover, the D-5 is a highly accurate weapon allowing "for targeting of hard and soft targets."⁵⁵

With the end of the Cold War American arms control concerns took on a new dimension in order to make sure that the weapons scheduled for destruction were in fact destroyed, especially given that many were now on the territories of newly independent states. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program provided, amongst other measures, for extensively intrusive U.S. on-site measures to supervise the denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Other undertakings dealt with elimination of chemical and biological weapons in Russia, as well as "safe and secure" storage of fissile material.⁵⁶

⁵³ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (Carlisle, Penn. U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), p. viii.

⁵⁴ Robert A. Manning, "The Nuclear Age: The Next Chapter," *Foreign Policy* (109) (Winter 1997/98), p. 73.

⁵⁵ Brian Bates and Chris McHorney, *Developing a Theoretical Model of Counterproliferation for the 21st Century* (Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, forthcoming). p.59 (Emphasis in original). Permission to quote has been obtained from the authors.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 56.