

to consider participating in regional security arrangements or regional military action in Asia.

(2) We recognize, however, that war and revolution in Asia, the partitioning of nations and basic changes in the balance of power since 1939 have created fundamental threats to world peace in Asia. We have, therefore, been willing to assign a high priority to our participation in United Nations operations in Korea and in India-Pakistan and to compliance with the request of the Geneva powers so far as service in the International Control Commissions is concerned.

(3) We consider that the isolation of Communist China from a large part of normal international relations is dangerous. We are prepared to accept the reality of the victory in mainland China in 1949. In the trade field we have significant contacts of a fairly normal nature. We consider, however, that the effective political independence of Taiwan is a political reality too.

(4) So far as the situation in Vietnam is concerned, Canada is more likely to contribute to peaceful settlement by its membership on the International Control Commission and by diplomatic assistance in the stages of preliminary negotiation or final settlement at a conference than by any other means.

(5) In that situation, we believe that ideological conversion by force, either through domestic subversion or foreign infiltration, will lead inexorably to great power intervention, to the extension of military pacts and to the escalation of risk of a world conflict.

(6) Economic development cannot, by itself, end conflict or guarantee peace, but we find it hard to envisage any steady progress towards political stability and peace which is not accompanied by the increasing satisfaction of material needs by the peoples concerned. Our expanding assistance programmes have been undertaken in recognition of this relation as well as in recognition of other considerations.

(7) Although we belong to the NATO or Western group of nations for historic and security purposes, and although our own political beliefs are clear, we do not consider that these facts should inhibit us from seeking friendly and often close relations with nations in other areas. Our membership in a multi-racial Commonwealth, our interest in countries retaining particular connections with French culture, our economic contacts with developing countries and our contacts with Asian countries in the United Nations are all intended to help develop a world community in which there will be no harsh lines of diversion between regional, racial or economic blocs.

(8) Finally, we believe that the events of the last World War, the initial problems of a change from colonial to independent status, revolutionary turmoil and economic problems have delayed the assumption by some leading Asian nations of their proper role in regional and world affairs. We have confidence that Japan, India, Pakistan and Indonesia can, along with China, do much to end abnormal situations in Asia and achieve a better balance of power and political influence in the world generally. We can scarcely speak of Canada being able, by itself, to promote

such broad developments to any significant degree. To the extent, however, that this approach can have a bearing on specific policy decisions of our own or can be reflected in joint action, this is our viewpoint....

CHINESE QUESTION

I believe that few subjects cause greater concern at present to Canadians reflecting on foreign affairs than the position of Communist China in the world community. That is one reason why this question is the object of constant review and re-appraisal on the part of the Government generally and on my part as Minister of External Affairs.

Canada recognizes the Republic of China, sometimes called Nationalist China. At the United Nations, most recently in November of last year, we voted against a resolution which called for the seating of representatives of the People's Republic of China and for the expulsion of the representatives of the Republic of China. I am aware that there is a substantial body of opinion in this country which disagrees with this policy. I think, however, that those who urge a radically different position on us sometimes neglect the thornier aspects of the problem of China. Alternative policies are, of course, possible; but those who advocate them should explain clearly how they propose to overcome some of the serious difficulties which the choice of those alternatives inevitably entails.

Those, for example, who urge the diplomatic recognition of Communist China must face the uncomfortable fact that the Government of that country demands that it be recognized as something which it patently is not: that is, the Government of the island of Taiwan.

Canada would welcome the opportunity to see Communist China take a seat in the United Nations. I said so last fall. In the General Assembly I said as well "...I hope that as events in Asia unfold, it may prove possible in the interests of this organization, and of mankind, to make progress toward what the Secretary-General, in his annual report, has described as the imperative need for the United Nations to achieve universality of membership as soon as possible".

But how to achieve this is another problem. Here, too, alternative policies are, of course, possible. But they are accompanied by similarly uncomfortable facts.

Those, for example, who would have us vote for the resolution which has until now been presented on this subject must accept the fact that it calls not only for the seating of Communist Chinese representatives but also for the denial of any status in the United Nations to representatives of over 12 million people on the island of Taiwan. Those who wish to be realistic and would give formal consecration to what they see as a situation of fact, by promoting a so-called "two Chinas" solution to this dilemma, must face the fact that it is no realistic solution at all, so long as both governments which lay claim to China reject it indignantly.