

behind new multilateral security policies in the field of proliferation is "a commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit."⁴¹ The implication is that conventional non-proliferation efforts will be embedded in a broader process, and that "arms control" itself will be transformed in two ways.

First, whatever emerges will be based on "a change in the principle mechanisms of control from denial of access to cooperatively induced restraint." Second, "a cooperative security system involving extensive agreed-on constraints on military preparations would have to require all parties to accept a level of intrusive monitoring of their defense programs."⁴²

Enhancing Supply-side Controls to Stem Conventional Proliferation

There are four sets of supply-side measures that could be promoted to stem conventional proliferation.⁴³ The simplest and most straightforward would expand existing non-proliferation measures dealing with the delivery systems of weapons of mass destruction to include sophisticated conventional delivery systems, in particular advanced combat aircraft. This would not require the development of new norms of supplier restraint, since the desirability of controlling the proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction has already been recognized in the MTCR. It would, however, not be able to strive for the "global zero" that characterized the MTCR (for specific categories of missiles), and hence would have to be targeted at particular states or groups of states. Between 40 and 50 states possess modern fighter/interceptor or strike aircraft, although only between 15 and 20 states in the developing world possess the most advanced models, such as the F-15, F-16, Su-24, MiG-29, or Tornado (including such states as India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and North Korea). The number of producers of such aircraft is small - Britain, France, Germany, the United States and Russia - and the diffusion of the most advanced models is not so far advanced that control over future proliferation cannot be considered. Most importantly, these weapons may actually be more significant as potential delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction than the ballistic missile technologies controlled under the MTCR!⁴⁴

by the Canadian government over the past four years.

⁴¹ Carter, Perry and Steinbrunner, 6.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 36, 38-39.

⁴³ For a general overview of supply-side measures, see Jean-François Rioux, *Limiting the Proliferation of Weapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992).

⁴⁴ For a provocative argument on the effectiveness of conventional weapons see John R. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness," *International Security*, 17:2 (Fall 1992), 41-83.