

consultants should state their judgements about whether use had occurred. Others insist that only the Secretary-General should have the authority to make that kind of judgement.

TECHNICAL ASPECTS

Ben Sanders was a former manager of the safeguards section of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nations will adhere to international agreements, he said, only if they can be sure, through adequate verification measures, that all parties are in strict compliance. Verification is rather unpopular. It is often resented because it intrudes into sovereign territory. Nowadays, states must accept the notion of an authority outside their own. However, there will always be a sense of confrontation between the verifying agency and the state under investigation.

There may be some specific lessons to be learned from the foundation of the IAEA, said Sanders. By the time of the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the agency had been in existence for a decade. Thus, the requirement to develop a verification system to deal with these important multilateral treaties meant simply adding staff to an existing administrative structure, as well as an experienced cadre of technical experts. For this reason, Sanders recommended early recruitment of technical experts -- in fact, even before the verification agency is set up.

A representative from the Embassy of Egypt said that the views of the US, the USSR and Canada were well-represented at the workshop, but he had hoped that the views held by the developing nations would also be taken into consideration. Specifically, he reminded participants that Third World nations had a right to develop their chemical industries to the degree achieved by the North. Many of the chemical precursors listed for export control were also used widely for civilian purposes. This problem had to be addressed to the satisfaction of Third World nations before they could be expected to accept a global Chemical Weapons Convention.