

matter. Such a technical study should inter alia include the specification of the equipment necessary for collecting data on atmospheric radioactivity; the procedures for the extraction and the exchange of radioactivity data, and the procedures to be used at International Data Centres for the compilation, processing and redistribution of data.

It might also include a preliminary estimate of the detection capability of a tentative global network of collecting stations.

In the draft treaty of Sweden additional international verification measures were mentioned, such as the exchange of data on hydro-acoustic signals in the oceans and infrasound and micro-barographic signals in the atmosphere should be established. It is essential that technical discussions also of these measures be initiated.

The question of on-site inspection has become an essential element of the verification arrangements of a CTB treaty. Agreement in principle seems to exist in this respect. The technical material which is available today on the various inspection techniques and their potential usefulness is, however, insufficient to allow an in-depth discussion of this issue. It is important that a technical basis for such discussion should be established without further delay. In our view these tasks could also preferably be given to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

It has recently been suggested that, while awaiting a political opening for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, a gradual approach should be considered. I have, of course, in mind the proposal presented to this Conference on 12 June this year by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, a proposal elaborated upon by the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai, in his statement at the plenary meeting of 26 July. The ideas thus presented represent an imaginative approach by defining the lowest yield of nuclear explosions for underground testing to be banned in relation to the state of the art of verification. If I understand the proposal of Japan correctly, explosions that can be detected and identified by an established international verification system should be banned, others not. The proposal is thus an example of a threshold arrangement. However, the threshold approach as such raises some fundamental questions. The experience of the existing threshold test-ban Treaty can hardly be described as encouraging. May I remind the delegates of the 1974 Treaty between the United States and the USSR, signed, not ratified but still adhered to. This Treaty limits nuclear-weapon-test explosions to yields below 150 kilotons. This is, by the way, an absurdly high level, considering that the Hiroshima bomb corresponds roughly to 1/10 of the yield taken as a limit for this Threshold Treaty. The implementation of the 1974 Threshold Treaty has been marred by suspicion between the Parties and has reduced rather than enhanced confidence between them.

Another concern, of a more political character, which must be taken into consideration with regard to both threshold proposals and other step-by-step approaches is that such proposals tend to legitimize nuclear-weapon testing. It is indeed difficult to imagine an international treaty negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament that would tolerate and condone underground nuclear-weapon tests. In the light of past experiences my delegation is bound to state that eventual undertakings to the effect that the nuclear-weapon States would "in good faith" negotiate a comprehensive test ban lacks credibility.

Sweden considers that a gradual threshold approach could be acceptable only if it is directly linked to a treaty on a comprehensive test ban. In practice this would mean that a test-ban treaty effective from a specific date must be concluded. The treaty could contain a phase-out period during which the testing would be gradually reduced and finally stopped. This would take place during a limited specified period of time. Examples of such possible phase-out procedures are given in the draft treaty presented by Sweden in 1977 in document CCD/526/Rev.1.

A threshold approach does not preclude modernization of nuclear arms. It is there-