

## Stopping Proliferation: IAEA Safeguards Reform



The Vienna International Centre, which houses the IAEA headquarters.

Petr Pavlicek/IAEA

The discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapon program in Iraq has raised questions about the international community's ability to detect violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and prompted a flurry of proposals for safeguards reform.

The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to renounce the nuclear weapons option and to put all of their nuclear activities under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA also safeguards some nuclear activities in nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT and in non-NPT states. Regular inspections by the IAEA verify that no non-peaceful uses of declared nuclear material, equipment, technology or facilities are taking place. However, despite regular inspections of Iraq's declared facilities for over a decade, the IAEA did not discover Saddam Hussein's secret nuclear bomb program. For those who believe the Agency's reputation has been tarnished by the Iraqi episode, only a tangible strengthening of safeguards will restore confidence in the IAEA.

Study of safeguards reform is taking place at the Agency itself, both internally and under a group of outside experts convened by IAEA Director Hans Blix. Mr. Mark Moher, Director General of EAITC's International Security, Arms

Control and CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) Affairs Bureau, is participating in this group in a private capacity. Proposals for reform are also being put forward by states and by groups of states. All of these efforts will start to come together in the summer, when reform options will be discussed by the IAEA General Conference and the Board of Governors.

Canada has been strongly encouraging and actively participating in efforts to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. In Canada's view, the main objective of safeguards reform should be to improve the capacity of the Agency to uncover undeclared nuclear activities, thus enhancing the *effectiveness* of IAEA safeguards. A second objective should be to improve safeguards *efficiency*, i.e., their cost/benefit ratio.

### Effectiveness Measures

Canada believes that priority should be given to the detection of clandestine efforts to evade non-proliferation responsibilities. This will require the provision of resources and the marshalling of collective will to exercise to the fullest the inspection rights inherent in the IAEA Statute and in individual safeguards agreements.

States under full-scope safeguards should be encouraged to accept the Agency's right of access "at any time, at any place" to declared or undeclared nuclear facilities. States should be reassured, however, that IAEA inspections do not threaten their legitimate military, scientific and industrial secrets, and that they in fact bolster sovereignty by enhancing security.

Canada thinks that the concept of "managed access," found in the Chemical Weapons Convention, could be adapted for some inspections in non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Managed access would allow states under inspection to protect secrets unrelated to undeclared nuclear activities. Another CWC-inspired reform would be the use of environmental sampling, especially to uncover reprocessing activities.

It will also be important to attain near-universal acceptance of transparency measures by states and by the Agency. Significant transparency measures include:

- the reporting of transfers of nuclear and nuclear-related items;
- the reporting of production of nuclear materials;
- the early provision of design information on nuclear facilities; and
- the creation of new reporting instruments by the Agency.

To be able to reach conclusions about the possible presence of clandestine nuclear activities, the IAEA must be endowed with sufficient capacity and competence to analyze information. This includes interpretation of data from open sources, from voluntary declarations, from inspection reports and from national intelligence means.

Nuclear-weapon states could agree to implement IAEA reforms, including access "any time, any place," on their civilian nuclear programs. They could consider accepting special inspections in any part of their territory, except on their declared military sector.

Non-NPT states could also voluntarily accept transparency measures, the "access any time, any place" principle and even special inspections. If special inspections are not possible, greater transparency, wider access and better intelligence could still enable the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in these states.