



ment which, in accordance with the mandate, will begin a process meaningful for building confidence and security as well as for the CSCE.

In speaking on behalf of the sponsors of SC.1*, the 16 Delegations which together made the first initiative at this Conference, I can say that we have therefore decided that we would be prepared to make moves in the following areas of the negotiation. Notification of ground force activities has often been described as the core of the agreement we have to adopt; the definition of the threshold for ground force activities is a key element of this measure. Three approaches to this problem have been presented: one puts the emphasis on structure; another on manpower; a third one on 'mobility and firepower,' which in practical terms means equipment. An attempt to combine these three approaches was recently made by the NNA States. We think that this is the right way to proceed and we would like to declare our readiness to draft on the basis of the proposal tabled by the Austrian Delegation on June 13. We hope others will take a similarly positive view....

The level of the threshold is an essential issue. Our approach is to emphasize structures, and the number of troops is only one element in this approach. It has been contended that our proposal would result in an excessive number of notifications per year. We do not think that the figures which were mentioned in support of this objection are accurate. But we are ready to consider raising the numerical element of the threshold beyond the figure of 6 000 troops. We seek increased confidence through militarily significant and verifiable confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) which cover the whole of Europe....

Moreover, we are prepared to make another move. Understanding of mobilization practices through notification would contribute significantly to greater

stability and confidence-building. However, we have heard concern expressed on our proposal relating to notification of mobilization activities. Some countries whose defence capabilities almost exclusively rely on the recall of reservists have argued that such a measure would affect their security interests.

We are willing to consider whether we could meet this preoccupation but we would expect similar consideration of our concern in other areas such as constraints where provisions have been advocated which, in turn, would unacceptably affect our security interests....

On observation we continue to believe that agreement to observe all notifiable military activities from their beginning to their end would be a substantial improvement over the provisions contained in the Final Act. But this ambitious aim has raised many logistic and financial objections. It is our view that observation should assist participating States in meeting the overall objectives of the confidence-building process: it must enable the observers to assess the scope and nature of military activity, which of course does not imply that the first man to leave and the last to return to normal peacetime locations should be observed.

Here again we are prepared to look sympathetically at the above-mentioned objections and consider a limitation on the duration of observation both as far as its starting and its ending are concerned. We expect this move to enable everybody both to agree to a low threshold for notification and to facilitate agreement on detailed and specific modalities for the observation regime.

On verification, our inspection proposal meets the mandate criteria and ensures each State equal opportunity to verify compliance with the agreed CSBMs. Objections have been raised, however, emphasizing the burden represented by our proposal. While we would have preferred to leave open the option for each participating State to conduct two inspections a year, we believe it is essential that each participating State should have the option to conduct at least one inspection a year. Central to

our approach to verification is the position that inspections must be an essential and integral part of the result of this Conference. However, we are entitled to carry out every year from two to one as evidence of our willingness to ensure against the abuse of the right to inspect military activities of other participating States....

The time has now come for new efforts to further the drafting process. The points I have just made are intended to serve that purpose. This is not of course the first example of our determination to reach an agreement. May I recall that on the issue of the non-use of force we have also made significant steps, first in agreeing to include this issue on the agenda of the Conference, then in tabling the most comprehensive contribution to date, and more recently in drafting actively on this subject. We have done this even though work in the field of concrete measures was stagnating.

The initiative we are taking represents careful study and sometimes difficult decisions on our part. In making these offers, that is, in showing yet again that we are prepared to be flexible, we must of course make it clear that we do so in the expectation that our other negotiating partners will show matching movements not only on the issues I have mentioned but also on others, such as information which I have not raised today. Nor would we expect our negotiating partners to introduce obstacles to real progress.

The only way to reach a substantive agreement is to follow a give-and-take process. We hope that the initiative taken by us today will create a dynamism leading to such an agreement in the eight weeks left to us before the Conference adjourns on September 19. We shall be prepared to do our part."

The outcome of the Stockholm Conference will be known by the time this issue is released. The results of the Conference and their significance for the future of conventional arms control in Europe will be examined in our next issue.

*NATO proposal