Israel has been strong and unremitting. It is difficult for people to act with the moderation and restraint through which wisdom expresses itself if they believe that they themselves live in the shadow of destruction and are uncertain about their very survival as a nation.

The fear from which the people of Israel suffer, the fear which explains the violence of reprisals which they have taken against their neighbours, will be on the way to elimination when the Arab States are willing to recognize Israel as a sovereign State and its right to national existence within accepted boundaries and under conditions of life tolerable to its people. There were some signs, a year or so ago, that we might at least be approaching a time when the Arab States would be willing to grant Israel this recognition. Unfortunately, the events of last autumn have reversed that trend. It must now be one of our major aims here to help set again in motion the forces which will lead to the early recognition of Israel in normal terms by its neighbours, and thus to the removal of fear.

On the other side, however, there is also fear which has led to extreme views, to extreme policies and to violence. Among the Arab States there is that deep and understandable apprehension that the displacement of population and the political tension already associated with the new State, most of whose citizens have come from abroad, a new State established in the midst of the Arab people, may be followed by still further dislocations owing to the pressure of immigration into Israel, backed as that State is by strong international pressures and international resources. There is a fear that Israel will yield to expansionist ambitions, which is the counterpart of Israel's own fear of Arab intentions. That has bred in the Arab world animosity and violence towards Israel. When that fear is dissipated we may count on moderation in the attitude of Israel's neighbours towards that State. As I see it, we cannot but agree that if Israel has a right to live and prosper, free from the fear of strangulation by its neighbours, the Arab States also have a right to feel confident that Israel will not attempt to expand its territory at their expense, the right to be assured that if Israel, however, should at any time develop such ambitions, it will receive no encouragement but meet only opposition on both the official and the non-official level from the outside world, an opposition which would result in the isolation of the State itself from any international assistance or support.

It is in this shadow of the past and present, the shadow of fear on both sides, that we have to consider the problem which is immediately before us. In my view, that problem is one of securing a fair and agreed basis for the withdrawal of Israel from those places which it still occupies beyond the Armistice Demarcation Line; a basis which can be used to increase security and create conditions conducive to peace. If we do not secure such a basis, we may fail completely to bring about this withdrawal —with consequences which will be tragic for us all, and perhaps especially for Israel. As I have said before in this Assembly, it is not a question in our minds of rewarding or punishing or of laying down conditions or refusing conditions; it is a question of associating the withdrawal of Israel with arrangements which should remove the necessity, or at least minimize the possibility, of facing this same problem a year or two from now.

From the very beginning of the present crisis, the Canadian Delegation has tried to keep in the forefront of its thinking on this question the importance of finding a solution not merely for the problem posed by military intervention, but for that posed by the conditions which brought about that intervention.

It was in that spirit that we advocated the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. We felt that by its action in bringing about an end of fighting, this Assembly was accepting responsibility for pursuing two related aims; the immediate aim of supervising and securing the cease-fire, and the longer-range objective of helping to create conditions in which it might be possible eventually to settle fundamental problems. We have insisted, even in the earliest days of this crisis, on our view that a return to stability would not flow merely from words or acts of condemnation; and that punishment was not in itself a substitute for progress towards peace.

Now, more than three months later, we are confronted with the need to strike a balance between the immediate and primary objective of securing the completion of Israel's withdrawal and that of achieving this in such a way that withdrawal will be accompanied by helpful and fruitful results. I repeat that, as far as our delegation is