

affected by it. In respect of Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir, for instance, it is still the case that the parties directly concerned and the people who live in the area must seek to determine the measures by which peace will be maintained in these areas. This is not only the most practical principle of action, it revives and strengthens a sense of responsibility at the point where it is most vital to healthy, political life, and it sets the objectives of an agreed, rather than an imposed solution.

The third general principle which seems to us to have emerged is that the Security Council should in all cases immediately concentrate its influence on putting an end to hostilities or disorders whenever they occur. By insisting on this principle, and by insisting equally that fighting shall be stopped without prejudice to the ultimate political solution, the Security Council has been on strong ground. It has not, of course, been able to command complete obedience. Fighting has recurred even in areas where a firm truce seemed to have been established, and it has not been possible to guarantee absolutely that the ultimate outcome of a dispute would not be affected by the military action which had taken place. In general, however, the primary concern of the Security Council, that peace should be kept while negotiations proceed, has been respected and has contributed materially to the progress which has been made in the settlement of disputes. The moral authority of our world organization—which seems to be all that it is now permitted to have—is no slight thing, and no state, great or small, lightly disregards its decisions.

The General Assembly also, like the Security Council, was under the necessity of working out means by which it could deal with practical and urgent questions that were referred to it. The Assembly was not inhibited in its work by any difficulty as definitive and frustrating as the veto, but it nevertheless suffered from the political division which arose in the post-war world. It was handicapped also from other difficulties which had not been anticipated in 1945. Its rules of procedure, even in the revised form which went into effect in 1949, were not sufficiently supported by self-discipline and unanimity of purpose amongst its members. In spite of efforts to improve the rules, it was difficult to offset the effects of direct obstruction by some members or irresponsible use of the Assembly's time by others. The Assembly was still uncertain also as to the best method of carrying out its business. The political work of the Assembly during each session was found to be more than a single political committee could complete, and the practice was adopted in 1948, and continued in 1949, of establishing an Ad Hoc Political Committee for the consideration of particular items referred to it. Differences of opinion then arose as to whether debates on particular items should take place in the First Committee or in the Ad Hoc Committee, and there was also uncertainty as to whether other than political items could be referred to the Ad Hoc Committee. The manner in which a sub-committee could be used to greatest effect was also in doubt. Many questions could not be adequately disposed of in full debate in a main committee, and required detailed discussion in sub-committee. On the other hand, time was wasted when a subject was referred to a sub-committee before the general principles upon which a resolution could be drafted had become clear. Gradually, however, workable precedents were set for the conduct of business, and a few of the worst anomalies of the rules of procedure were abandoned. Progress in this respect was helped as committee chairmen became more fully aware of their responsibilities and more sure of their authority. At the Fourth Session, the general desire of the Assembly to conserve time was expressed in a further extensive revision of the rules of procedure, designed to strengthen the hands of the chairmen of committees.

Italian Colonies and Jerusalem were the most important subjects of concrete importance upon which the Assembly was required to take specific action during 1949. In both cases the distribution of territories and the