

Council acts, that will satisfy us, and there is nothing in this draft resolution which interferes in any way with such action.

But if it does not act, or if it is unable to act, what then? Are we to sit back and admit the final and complete failure of our peace machinery? That would be an admission of defeat and despair, and we are not willing to make such an admission. One way out of this dilemma, of course, is the building up of regional and limited collective security systems, such as that under the North Atlantic Treaty. These do help to close the gaps in our security system, but they are only partial and limited devices. It is the United Nations itself, our universal organization—we must try to keep it that—which must be strengthened; among other ways, by strengthening the Assembly along the lines of the draft resolution. We must organize—through the General Assembly, and in the event of the Security Council failing in its duty—force behind the law; force to stop aggression; force to carry out Assembly recommendations which are accepted by its Members. It is, of course, only by recommendation that the General Assembly can act—and nothing in this draft resolution changes that—but recommendations, as we know now from the events of June, can have a force as strong and compelling as any mandate, when right and justice are behind them.

Mr. Vishinsky made a great effort yesterday to prove that this draft resolution is illegal and contrary to the Charter in many of its terms, but I do not think he will have convinced those of us who are not already satisfied that anything he says is convincing. He has overlooked, of course, one essential point which I have already mentioned, namely, that the Assembly is being given powers which are not only within the Charter, but are to be used only after the Security Council itself has failed to take or been unable to take action. The acceptance of Mr. Vishinsky's legal argument merely means that the United Nations cannot take any action at all to safeguard peace and security, if the Security Council is made powerless by any one of its members. We do not and cannot believe that the United Nations Charter sanctions any such futility.

The Canadian Delegation, in sponsoring this draft resolution, considers that the General Assembly, by voting these proposals, would be simply making provision to utilize certain powers which it already possesses. And that is the

basis of our position. We do not think of these proposals as constituting any radical or revolutionary departure in interpretation of the Charter, but rather as practical measures to meet situations in which the purposes of the United Nations might be frustrated. We consider that the time has now come to spell out certain measures which, within the terms of the Charter, the General Assembly and its members can take to be more fully prepared for such emergencies in the future.

In his statement yesterday, Mr. Vishinsky spent a good deal of time in an endeavour to prove that our proposal to make the General Assembly better able to deal with matters which the Security Council had failed to resolve, was contrary to Article 11 of the Charter. The Representative of the Soviet Union argued that because of Article 11—and regardless of any action that could be taken under Article 10—the Assembly must refer to the Security Council—without taking any other action whatever, any question on which action is necessary. That seems to us to be a strange doctrine to hear from the lips of Mr. Vishinsky, because, on repeated occasions, he has brought into this Assembly resolutions which contained recommendations in the strongest and most precise language on subjects which either were or could be on the agenda of the Security Council. Within the last week, for example, in this very room, he has urged us to adopt a resolution recommending that all sorts of things should happen in Korea, including the withdrawal of United Nations troops. He is now trying to tell us that it is illegal under the Charter for the Assembly to recommend that United Nations troops should be sent into Korea to prevent invasion, but that it is not in the least illegal for the Assembly to recommend that United Nations troops should be withdrawn from Korea in order that the country may be at the mercy of the invader.

Mr. Vishinsky of course likes to have it both ways, and, in the many debates in which he has participated during the course of the last two decades, he has never been worried too much by the concept of consistency. But he cannot really expect to carry conviction by this kind of argument. He cannot invoke the first part of Article 11, paragraph 2, in the first week of October to advocate the kind of solution he wants in Korea, and then invoke the second part of the same paragraph in the second week of October for exactly the opposite purpose.