

sufficient to warrant the conclusion that that preceding life was the sequel of one prior still, in which also the soul had true opinions in it; and so on without limit, through all past time.—Q. E. D.

The passage which Stallbaum regards as inconsistent with that which has been expounded, is the following: 'Ἀτε ὅνν ἡ ψυχὴ ὁθανάτος τε ὄνσα καὶ πολλακὶς γεγόνυια, καὶ ἑώρακνυια καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ πάντα χρηματά, ὅκ ἐστίν ὁ τι ὄν μεκαθῆκεν, ὥστε ὄνδεν θαυμαστόν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἀλλῶν ὄιον τε εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι ἂ γε καὶ προτέρον ἤπιστάτο. ἄτε γάρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενούς ὄνσης, καὶ μεμαθῆκνυια τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπάντα, ὄνδεν κῶλνυει ἐν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὁ δὲ μαθησιν καλόνσιν ἄνθρωποι, τᾶλλα πάντα αὐτόν ἀνευρεῖν.—(Meno, § 15). Stallbaum's words are: "Quum enim in superiore disputatione" (the passage just quoted, the *earlier* of the two) "animum in alia atque alia loca migrasse eoque modo omnia didicisse dixerit, equis est quin male hic" (the passage discussed in the former part of our Note, the *later* of the two) "affirmari sentiat animum veras opiniones semper habuisse et tenuisse?" It would be very strange if this criticism were well founded. That Plato propounds, not only in the same dialogon, but in immediate juxta-position, two flatly contradictory theories on an important subject—is what we must not, except on the most distinct evidence, be asked to believe. But what ground is there for the charge of inconsistency? In the earlier passage, the soul, assumed to be immortal, is represented as having been often generated (πολλακὶς γεγόνυια) into new states of being. It is not necessary to restrict the word πολλακὶς to any definite number of times. The circumstance, that the frequent generation spoken of is viewed as a consequence of the soul's immortality, leads us rather to suppose that an unlimited series of generations is intended. Now, the doctrine that the human soul has undergone an unlimited series of generations in time past, has been shewn to be necessarily involved in the later passage likewise. Again, according to the earlier passage, the soul, having undergone frequent generation, and passed often to and from Hades, has—thus migrating "in alia atque alia loca"—learned all things (ὅκ ἐστίν ὁ τι ὄν μεμαθῆκεν). Here we must by no means assume (as Stallbaum appears to have done) that *a learning for the first time* is meant. This, of course, would be irreconcilable with the view brought out in the later passage, that the soul never was without having learned. But Plato says nothing about the soul learning things for the first time. He merely says