

possibly escape and that they had a number of Indians from the Northwest, by no means as easily controlled as those from the vicinity, and having suffered very severely they were outrageous and would commence a general massacre; he was therefore desirous to save the effusion of blood and demanded a surrender. He was told that we knew how to die, and they should hear from us in a few minutes. He returned very shortly, repeating the summons, and added that if we did not believe we were outnumbered and could not possibly escape, an officer would be permitted to view their troops. Lieutenant Goodwin was sent and arriving at the head of the lane where a part of their force was stationed, Colonel DeHaren ordered him back, saying this was too humiliating to be permitted. On his return the commanding officer asked those under his command what was to be done. The second-in-command observed he was willing to do anything, (in other words to give no opinion.) The commanding officer said he did not ask the opinion of his officers or wish them to bear any share of the blame that might attach; he was commanding officer and therefore would take all the responsibility; he only wished to know their view of the situation. Some of them observed they did not think it possible, with such a force around us, the exhausted state of our men and seventeen miles to retreat, the road running principally through woods, that one-fourth of us could escape death, as we must retreat in regular order along the road, while the immense number of Indians would constantly hang on our flanks and rear and shoot us down at pleasure without our being enabled to injure them, more especially when our few remaining cartridges should be expended. This coinciding with the opinion of the commanding officer, Captain McDowell was directed to obtain the best terms he could, which consisted in permitting the officers to retain their side arms and horses, the militia to return home on parole and the detachment to surrender prisoners of war.

Thus terminated one of the most unfortunate and impolitic expeditions that ever was planned. Five hundred men were risked "to batter down with a twelve and six-pounder Decoo's stone house, said to be fortified and garrisoned with a company of regulars and sixty to one hundred Indians to capture or dislodge the enemy and return by the way of St. Davids and Queenston."

This intelligence was derived from a source decidedly not entitled to confidence, having long previous to this been known by many for an unblushing liar; besides he had not been within several miles of the post to be attacked, of the strength of which he undertook to give a particular detail. The situation and force of the enemy was this: Lieutenant FitzGibbon was stationed with a company of regulars at Decoo's house. Captain William J. Kerr, whose official account