ground, it seems to me, to every lawyer in this House, that when a verdict is reached by a jury against evidence you may go to the Court of Appeal, and when the verdict is against the weight of evidence you may go to the Court of Appeal, and in either of these two cases you must consider the question of the sufficiency, so to speak, of the evidence to establish the charges. But there is another ground common to all members of this House engaged in the practice of the legal profession, and that is whether or not there is any evidence at all to submit to the jury, and if there be no evidence to submit to the jury any judgment founded upon that state of facts must inevitably be set aside. Within he last two years I presented unsuccessfully to the Supreme Court here, on behalf of the appellant a case in which the Grand Trunk Pacific was the respondent and in that case the learned judge had left to the jury the question of negligence. The issue in the Supreme Court was whether or not there was any evidence at all to go to the jury upon that issue, and the court here held that the mere fact that the ladder had slipped was not in itself evidence of negligence, and therefore the verdict of the jury, and the judgment of the court based upon such verdict, must be set aside, because there was no evidence to go to the jury.

They did not enter into any discussion with respect to the credibility of the witnesses; they did not enter into any discussion of the character of the evidence; they merely determined, on a perusal of the record, that there was no evidence whatever to leave to the jury. In this case the Government of this country, speaking for every member of Parliament, determined that the accused minister, in view of the statements made by him, was entitled to have a court of appeal determine whether or not there was any evidence to be left to the jury. Two gentlemen of eminence, one the Chief Justice of New Brunswick and the other an ex-Justice of Quebec, reviewed the evidence, went over the findings, considered the conclusions. Any lawyer in this House, however biased his opinion, or however prejudiced his views may be, will agree that in the testimony referred to in the report of Mr. Justice McLeod and Mr. Justice Tellier there is not a single scintilla of evidence upon which an appellate tribunal would determine that there was any evidence to go to the jury. Of course, as the member for Halifax (Mr. A. K. Maclean) has said, the ex-Minister of Public Works should have been represented, but he was not. Serene in the consciousness of his own innocence with respect to the charges preferred against him, he was willing that the matter should be heard without his being represented by counsel. Having regard to the circumstances, and to the high state of party feeling which prevailed at the time of the hearing before Commissioner Galt, the judges who sat as the appelate court properly concluded that the views of counsel had obtained over the evidence. The counsel who presented the case on behalf of the province did it so powerfully and so strongly that they were able to convince the learned Commissioner Galt that certain charges had been well preferred; that they had been established to his satisfaction.

Hon. gentlemen in this House must put themselves in exactly the same position as that in which the ex-minister found himself. Unfounded in fact, without a scintilla of evidence, without there being a line of testimony to support it, the conclusion arrived at by a tribunal properly constituted by the province of Manitoba was that there was evidence of guilt, when in fact there was none. Would hon. gentlemen not expect the Government of the day, under these circumstances, to ask that a commission be appointed for the purpose of reviewing that testimony—not of reviewing it in the broad sense of the term, but to determine really whether or not there was any evidence that might be left to any jury to which a man might with safety and confidence appeal in respect of the charges preferred against him? I do submit that this item should be carried. This expenditure was properly incurred. The case of one ex-Minister of Public Works may be the case of some other gentleman to-morrow; it might well be the case of some other gentleman now. This Parliament, under all constitutional usages and precedents, being the custodian of its own honour—the Government being the mouthpiece of this Parliament—must ever be on the alert to protect the reputation of its members from assaults that may be made against them under the stress and strain of bitter partisanship. Is it reasonable, at a time when the prejudices of men's minds were excited by certain revelations in Manitoba, that, Mr. Rogers, simply because he had taken a very active part in the elections and had been a member of the Provincial Government, should be charged with malfeasance and maladministration, and stripped of his reputation? Is it rea-