

JAMES MACKINTOSH that the English system of Government is something like a nobleman's mansion. It has been occupied for generations, it has had alterations made in it and additions built, and it is exceedingly unsymmetrical; but it is also very convenient, and it would be a very unwise act to tear it down to its foundations for the purpose of building a better and more symmetrical edifice. At the same time, no man in his senses would choose it as a model if he had to build from the foundations. It seems to me, Sir, that this very wise and thoughtful observation, made by a very distinguished English statesman, was lost sight of when these provisions of our constitution were prepared by the delegates to London. I do not think we are bound to imitate the English system of Government in any particular where our circumstances are so totally different from theirs that what is admirably adapted to the English people is in no way suited to us. It is not necessary that we should copy a dead limb of the British constitution in order to show our attachment to that which is green and vigorous, any more than it is necessary for us to shave our heads to show our parental affection simply because our grandfathers may be bald. We have not sir, followed the English system of Parliamentary representation. We have adopted the system of representation by population, which is essentially American in its origin. The English system of Parliamentary representation is a representation of interests. There never has been any serious attempt there to base representation by population. It has always been said by those who have exercised the controlling influence in the Government of that country that in their system of representation they have kept in view all the multifarious interests of the nation, and the representatives of the people of Great Britain in the Imperial Parliament have resolved that no single interest shall have a controlling influence in the legislation of the country. That, sir, is quite clear if you look at the populations of London and Scotland, which are about equal, for you will find Scotland returning many more representatives than the City of London. I think, sir, we acted wisely in taking population as a basis of representation in this House, that we did well to treat our own people as

a unit, that in doing so we have taken an important step towards consolidating them, as far as they have common interests, into a real nationality; and it seems to me we would do equally well in looking at the federal features of our Government and establishing a second chamber which would serve some of the important purposes for which a second chamber ought to exist. We sometimes forget, sir, the very rapid changes that take place in a single generation in this country. Lord MACAULAY, not long before his death, speaking of the representation system of England, thought the period of seven years was too long. He said when the Septennial Act was carried English society moved much more slowly than it did in his day; that the changes in five years was greater than had occurred in seven years a century before, and because they were greater it was necessary that the elections should be more frequent in order to adjust the opinions of the House of Commons to the opinions of the nation. Now, Sir, when we look at our Senate, what do we find? We find that the average political life of a Senator is fifteen years, while that of a representative of the people is but two and a half years. Is it possible that such a body as the Senate can be fairly said in any measure to represent the people of this country, that they can be the guardians of any public interest in this country, that they can serve any useful purpose as a legislative body, other than that of taking away the idea of absolute power being possessed by this House. There can be no doubt that whatever position you place public men in, if you completely separate them from the rest of the community and make them completely independent, you unfit them for the discharge of legislative functions. It is necessary in every vocation and position of life that there should be a sense of dependence on our fellow countrymen. Without this essential dependence we become utterly unfit to discharge our duties properly as members of the State, and any legislative body that is completely separated from the rest of the community, that is in no way obliged to conform to the public opinion of the country or show any deference to that public opinion, is in no way qualified to perform the important duties that