

"As with any other ideological system, one may accept or reject the ideology of Hitlerism - that is a matter of political views. But everyone will understand that an ideology cannot be destroyed by force, that it cannot be eliminated by war. It is therefore not only senseless, but criminal to wage such a war - a war for the 'destruction of Hitlerism', camouflaged as a fight for 'democracy'."

But suddenly in June 1941, it became a war for democracy and the liberation of enslaved people.

It is this kind of thing, repeated ad infinitum, by Communists all over the world, which has convinced us that international communism has become the tool of Soviet foreign policy, and is a menace to our security. Our fears are not removed by quotations from interviews given by Mr. Stalin to Western journalists about the pacific character of communism. We can match every one of those with a dozen which prove the opposite, from Lenin and from Stalin, and from other lesser leaders. There is that famous one of Lenin's:

"As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph - a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism."

These are not, as Mr. Vishinsky complains, contemporary statements, but the bible - which I take it in Russia consists of the sayings of Lenin and Stalin, is never out of date.

However, as Lenin himself once wrote:

"In view of the extreme complexity of social phenomena it is always easy to select any number of examples or separate data to prove any point one desires."

So here again we will await with eagerness, if with some caution, not words, but actions which will prove in the days ahead that communism on the one hand and capitalism or democratic socialism on the other can, like the lion and the lamb, lie down together, and rise later without one being inside the other.

Meanwhile, the free democracies are determined not to be deflected from their resolve to become stronger, not for aggressive purposes, not in order to force, at the point of the atom bomb, diplomatic decisions on the Soviet Union, but because they fear aggression and wish to put collective force behind their will for peace in order to deter and prevent it; because negotiations for peace have a better chance of succeeding if the parties, not accepting each other's views, respect at least each other's strength. Permanent peace can, of course, never be ensured by power alone; but power on both sides, not merely on one, may give a breathing space in which to pause, reflect and improve relations. This course will be attacked as power politics, but power politics are often merely the politics of not being over-powered. So it is in this case.

The Soviet resolution objects to this. It says disarm now, at once, by one-third. That point has already been suitably disposed of by previous speakers. I would merely ask one question. In any disarmament convention, would the Soviet government agree that the United Nations agency set up by the Convention should have the right to go anywhere, at any time, to ascertain, by