

The United States is entirely willing that all parties to the Locarno treaties should become parties to its proposed antiwar treaty either through signature in the first instance or by immediate accession to the treaty as soon as it comes into force in the manner provided in Article III of the American draft, and it will offer no objection when and if such a suggestion is made.

(4) Treaties of neutrality. The United States is not informed as to the precise treaties which France has in mind and cannot therefore discuss their provisions. It is not unreasonable to suppose, however, that the relations between France and the States whose neutrality she has guaranteed are sufficiently close and intimate to make it possible for France to persuade such States to adhere seasonably to the antiwar treaty proposed by the United States.

If this were done, no party to the antiwar treaty could attack the neutralized States without violating the treaty and thereby automatically freeing France and the other powers in respect of the treaty-breaking State from the obligations of the antiwar treaty. If the neutralized States were attacked by a State not a party to the antiwar treaty, the latter treaty would, of course, have no bearing and France would be as free to act under the treaties guaranteeing neutrality as if she were not a party to the antiwar treaty.

It is difficult to perceive, therefore, how treaties guaranteeing neutrality can be regarded as necessarily preventing the conclusion by France or any other power of a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war.

(5) Relations with a treaty-breaking State. As I have already pointed out, there can be no question as a matter of law that violation of a multilateral antiwar treaty through resort to war by one party thereto would automatically release the other parties from their obligations to the treaty-breaking State. Any express recognition of this principle of law is wholly unnecessary.

(6) Universality. From the beginning it has been the hope of the United States that its proposed multilateral antiwar treaty should be world-wide in its application, and appropriate provision therefor was made in the draft submitted to the other governments on April 13. From a practical standpoint it is clearly preferable, however, not to postpone the coming into force of an anti-war treaty until all the nations of the world can agree upon the text of such a treaty and cause it to be ratified.

For one reason or another a State so situated as to be no menace to the peace of the world might obstruct agreement or delay ratification in such manner as to render abortive the efforts of all the other Powers. It is highly improbable, moreover, that a form of treaty acceptable to the British, French, German, Italian and Japanese governments, as well as to the United States, would not be equally acceptable to most, if not all, of the other Powers of the world. Even were this not the case, however, the coming into force among the above-named six Powers of an effective antiwar treaty and their observance thereof would be a practical guaranty against a second world war.

This in itself would be a tremendous service to humanity, and the United States is not willing to jeopardize the practical success of the proposal which it has made by conditioning the coming into force of the treaty upon prior universal or almost universal acceptance.

*Translation of Note from the Foreign Minister of Italy to the United States Ambassador at Rome under date of May 5, 1928, in Reply to the United States Ambassador's Note of April 13, 1928*

I have the honour to refer to my note of April 23rd, relative to the proposal of the United States Government regarding a multilateral Anti-War Treaty.

I hardly need to assure you that Italy, adhering to the policy which she is constantly following, has welcomed with lively sympathy this initiative and offers very willingly her cordial collaboration towards reaching an agreement.