

greater level of cooperation. The process of formalising bilateral agreements, such as INCSEA, can provide the first step in a sequence of formal staff talks.

#### **Communications Measures**

Communications measures are logical in theory, particularly in the form of crisis control centres. However, the Middle East navies do not have a great deal of operational contact with each other and thus have little experience in coordinated operations. As long as their naval forces have primarily "policing" roles or act as extensions of land operations, there is little incentive for increased cooperation. But when those forces are used in broader constabulary roles, especially within the framework of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea or in support of a specific maritime convention (SAR and pollution control in particular), the need for cooperation increases. In this, establishing Regional Crisis Control Centres becomes a very logical objective with considerable potential. Furthermore, such centres might eventually grow into surveillance and movement coordination centres that would integrate naval and commercial shipping operations into regional traffic control systems similar to those used in many international straits and high-use maritime areas.

#### **Activity Constraint Measures**

Activity constraint measures would normally be imposed either as a result of a military defeat or by mutual agreement. Only the latter situation is of interest in this study. Because of the lack of routine contact between the various regional naval forces, formal INCSEA agreements of the type structured for the North American and European navies are likely to have reduced application in the Middle East. However, there is considerable symbolic value in such agreements. Moreover, as has been discussed, the annual meetings called for in existing INCSEA