

would permit the international community (or portions thereof) to detect reliably the development of weapon systems that were deemed intolerable — primarily NBC weapons by non-signatories of existing or future conventions (NPT and CWC)?

How should monitoring and verification resources (both technical and organizational) be used to deal with activities of states that are not party to existing arms control and confidence-building agreements? There are a number of issues involved. The basic activities of interest include arms transfers; the development of nuclear weapons; the development of chemical weapons; and the development of “restricted” or “dangerous” technologies (e.g., ballistic missiles). Can this type of regime only be operated effectively by the UN? Could a regional bloc develop such a regime?

Will the removal or conversion of fissile material from nuclear weapons create any special verification difficulties? Will any special technologies need to be developed or applied for this task? Could this best be handled through the IAEA? How will the verification of this compare with the verification of other procedures for the destruction of weapons? Could common protocols be developed for all destruction measures?

Would the development of “reactive arms control” agreements meet concerns about excessively intrusive verification regimes? These are agreements in which specified monitoring and inspection measures can become increasingly rigorous, but only in reaction to the crossing of certain thresholds of worrisome military behaviour. How could this type of approach be operationalized? Are there any obvious drawbacks to the basic concept?

What additional types of arms control negotiation and agreement (beyond the examples of existing forums) might come into existence in the next 10 or so years? What types of forces and activities not currently addressed by arms control agreements need to be addressed by arms

control and confidence-building measures? What kind of verification demands will these new forums make?

Monitoring and Verification of Activities Other than those Subject to an Arms Control Agreement

“Verification” is usually associated with arms control and confidence-building agreements. Are there other national and international activities, problems or concerns in addition to the verification of arms control and confidence-building agreements to which technologies and/or organizations for monitoring and compliance evaluation can contribute — peacekeeping support; environmental monitoring; resource monitoring and development; weather forecasting; natural disaster relief; the detection of drug smuggling and illegal immigration; early warning of conflicts among non-participant states; international terrorism; media support and so on? Does this approach effectively require the creation of multilateral or international bodies to manage these resources? This idea of associating a number of separate uses with verification resources could be significant, because these other uses could help to make the costs of monitoring and processing information seem more bearable and worthwhile. There are also a number of difficult political, operational and legal issues that would need to be examined before endorsing this sort of dual or multi-use approach to the creation and use of resources primarily intended for the monitoring of arms control.

Working in the reverse direction, are there — or might there be — information-gathering resources associated with non-arms control activities that could be employed for verification purposes? To what extent might they be made more feasible if the arms control and confidence-building verification function was attached to them? As mentioned previously, what types of legal problems might be associated with this approach?

