

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

resulting in a renewed readiness to deal effectively with them during the second half of the session. If the time, enthusiasm and effort spent by most delegations do not lead to tangible progress in key areas during the summer session, there is a risk that discouragement will take the upper hand.

The verification system is the key to the chemical weapons convention. Mr. Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany has provided an inspired and dedicated chairmanship of Working Group 1. It is, however, a matter of concern that we have not been able to provide a clear picture of the general pattern of verification.

A number of delegations have felt that there may be a need for additional verification measures, beyond routine inspections of declared facilities and mandatory challenge inspections. Proposals like those on spot checks by Australia, ad hoc checks by the Federal Republic of Germany and ad hoc inspections by the United Kingdom, have considerable merit. They have been given thorough study by my delegation, and we have participated in the discussions of these proposals with an open mind. However, it seems that those discussions have left many questions unanswered. The reason for this is of course that it is difficult to concretize additional measures when we do not know to what they are supposed to be added. My delegation, therefore, is inclined to agree with the view stated by Ambassador Friedersdorf on 18 April when he said that we are approaching the question from the wrong direction.

The procedures for routine inspection under article VI have been worked out in some detail. Further input is expected from the national trial inspections so that the "rolling text" may be improved. This is one part of the general pattern of verification where important results have been achieved. It must be supplemented by further work on the schedules, not least on schedule [2], part B, and a consideration of new agents. In this context a "waiting and warning list" constitutes an interesting approach.

There seems to be general agreement on the need for mandatory challenge inspections. However, the agreement ends there. This stands in contrast to the degree of elaboration on routine inspection in the "rolling text". There is as yet no agreement, for example, on how to initiate a challenge inspection, the specificity of the request and at what time it should be communicated to the challenged State. Procedures for access to the facility, measures to protect confidential information not related to chemical weapons, report writing, submission and assessment of the inspection report are still not agreed.

Differing views are held regarding the role of the challenging State and the Technical Secretariat throughout the challenge inspection. To what extent should the observer of the challenging State be able to influence the decisions of the inspection team? Should conclusions be drawn in the inspection report, by the Executive Council or by States parties individually, first and foremost the challenging State?