

Efforts should be made to identify, and place limitations on, any specific protective equipment and activities which are particularly valuable for use of chemical weapons. For confidence-building purposes, information should be provided on activities related to protection against chemical weapons.

Confidence in the declaration of stocks is particularly important for confidence in the effectiveness of the treaty regime as a whole. Additional measures should be developed which will promote, at the earliest possible stage, confidence in the stockpile declaration.

Until the destruction process has been completed, the existence of chemical weapons stocks poses a risk that these chemical weapons may be used in a surprise attack. Confidence-building measures should be devised to provide confirmation that chemical weapons have not been moved from declared storage sites and that any effort to do so would be detected promptly.

#### IV. OTHER PROVISIONS

##### Withdrawal

The Convention should contain a withdrawal provision along the lines of those in previous arms control agreements.

##### Entry into force

To be effective and durable, a future Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be adhered to by as many States as possible. The United States hopes that all States would deem it to be in their interest to join in the Convention. The United States can support an approach under which the Convention would enter into force on ratification by a suitable number of States.

##### Additional Provisions

The Convention should also contain a preamble and provisions regarding:

- (a) international co-operation in the field of chemistry;
- (b) the relationship with other treaties;
- (c) amendment;
- (d) review conferences;
- (e) duration;
- (f) signature, ratification and accession;
- (g) languages and distribution.

##### Annexes

The annexes to the Convention should be considered an integral part of the Convention.