

been a basic element in shaping the United States view of its role in the Pacific.

This American influence, like the other regional power factors, is in the process of changing. It seems inevitable that, even after the hostilities in Indochina have been brought to an end, the United States will remain a major military presence in the Pacific, although the nature of this involvement will probably not take the same form. The tangible manifestations of this presence may be less pervasive and considerably modified by the evolution within the area of other power sources, both economic and political, and the emergence of new configurations of strength and influence.

The activities of the Soviet Union are likely to grow, largely for economic and strategic reasons in the North Pacific, more for political reasons in Southeast Asia as a corollary of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The growth in Soviet activity and influence should be seen, at least in part, as the almost inevitable global interest of a super-power. China's chief external preoccupation, if its suspicion of American intentions gradually diminishes, will be the security of its long frontier with the Soviet Union. Within the limits of this preoccupation and its massive internal problems, China will seek to promote its interests to the extent of exerting preponderant influence over the states along its borders.

As it surges ahead economically, Japan will undoubtedly play a more active role in all fields—trade, aid, political influence and possibly even security—particularly in Southeast Asia. By and large, this is a natural and inevitable development. To the extent that it contributes to regional stability, it is to be encouraged.

With the British withdrawal, the military influence of Australia has become more significant in Southeast Asia. Indonesia must also be regarded as a nascent power among the non-Communist nations because of its position and population, and the development potential of its natural resources.

The nations of Southeast Asia are the inheritors of great cultural traditions which they want to preserve as part of maintaining their national independence. Other problems they face in stimulating economic and social improvements are aggravated by the direct and indirect pressures to which they are subjected by the major powers attempting to extend their own influence. The smaller Southeast Asian nations, caught between these contending forces, must seek to derive maximum advantage from them while ensuring that the contest itself submerges neither their cultural inheritance nor their political freedom.